



Graduate School of Arts & Sciences 
 
 
Liberal Studies Master of Arts 





Contested Representations, Conflicted Identities :   
 
















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 









       Until recently the public sphere in Pakistan has been faced with a virulent socio-
religious polarization that ultimately manifested itself across the political spectrum. At 
the extreme ends are two segments of the population, one apparently 'radical' and 
'religious' and the other presumably 'liberal' and 'secular'. Such rivalry has created 
contentious divisions along numerous, cross-cutting cleavages in which 'religion' has 
again and again proven to be the primary fault line. The 'radical' right-wing religious 
forces seem to be vehemently competing with so called 'liberal' elements for decisive 
representation in the public sphere in Pakistan, which is consequently largely 
dominated by these two factions.  
 
        However these two contested positions do not seem to reflect the aspirations of the 
majority of ordinary people of Pakistan, who do not support religious fundamentalism 
or manifestly espouse supposedly anti-religious secular values.(Marsden 2005; Lieven 
2011; Nasr 2009; Qadeer 2006) but have not found a definitive voice or a representative 
space in the political or public sphere. Consequently the multiplicity of the expressions 
of religion which exist in Pakistan have not been able to be articulated meaningfully in 
the public sphere. The diverse and competing forms of religiosity, identities and 
traditions in Pakistan, such as divisions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ Islam, 
'institutionalized' orthodox Islam and the 'popular' lived forms of a Muslim personality 
are all too often overlooked and treated as incommensurable identities that are mapped 
onto society in Pakistan in a one-dimensional and self-defining way. This study seeks to 
contest this form of representation and underlines the need to rethink the idea of a 
unitary 'Islam' in Pakistan because as recent scholarship on Islam shows that 'there are 
not enough categories' that could express the multiplicity of positions in Islam or 
highlight the diverse ways of being a Muslim in the present world (Hallaq 2009; Dabashi 
2009).  In this sense this study argues for the need for new frames of analysis which can 
apply a different mode of understanding to re-attend to the history and presence of 
religiosity in Pakistan.  
 
 3 
Religion as a Contested Space in Pakistan:  
 
     This study will discuss how the current discussions on religion in Pakistan, and by 
implication secularism, are attended by shrill polemic from two opposing world views. 
The events of the past decade (including 9/11, the subsequent war on terror, the rise of 
religious politics globally) have intensified what was earlier only a latent schism 
between religious and secular world views and therefore 'an insurmountable divide' is 
posited between strong religious belief and a secular worldview.1 Because of this potent 
rivalry an 'alienating Islamic identity' has been created in opposition to a 'Westernized 
non-religious' one. So that being 'liberal' in Pakistan indicates in general terms that 'one 
has pro-Western tendencies and finds any mention of Islam abhorrent' while being 
'religious' affirms that one is aggressively 'anti-Western and a follower of some puritan 
interpretation of Islam'. 2  To add to this, any dissent to both of these camps is 
admonished decisively and instantly labeled as 'un-Islamic' by the religious right wing 
and considered 'pro-jihadist' by the liberals. The 'liberals' look down on 'Islam' and 
present the specter of 'Talibanization of Pakistan' to banish Islam from the public 
discourse (Husain 2012; Rashid 2012; Ahmed 2010) while the fundamentalists use 
religious dogma for political purposes to undercut rivals and demand unwilling 
submission from the public (Lieven 2011; Husain 2011; Ali 2008). The contestation over 
religion manifests itself in debates on sartorial and linguistic choices among other social 
habits and even over national icons. In a sense the figure of Pakistan's founding father 
M.A. Jinnah, can be seen as a metaphor for the contestation over 'the Pakistani identity', 
as it makes the liberals uncomfortable  because of 'too much Islam' in his public position 
while the religious orthodoxy derides him for 'not being Islamic enough'. 3  Such 
contestation takes place in the media and academia and even literally in public places, so 
that public spaces become 'sites of contestation' (Butler and Habermas 2010), as can be 
witnessed from the recent 'blackout' of fashion billboards with public service messages 
in Karachi 4 and the defacing of female images earlier in the NWFP 5 . Such public 
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contests become entangled in the invocations of the freedom of expression and public 
morality with social commentators from both factions either condemning or celebrating 
their articulation. Ironically the only similarity these two factions share is that both 
perceive Islam as a rigid unitary phenomenon. In this sense both the 'liberals' and the 
radical religious groups seem to be appropriating Islam relentlessly for their own 
benefits and purposes (Lieven 2011; Hassan 2007). Given this context the pursuit of a 
liberal lifestyle or the domination of Islamized symbols and values takes precedence 
over the attainment of democratic social ideals for both factions.6  
 
       In this regard this study will attempt to assess the extent of the correlation between 
religious and political factors which has fused to create the current state of affairs in 
Pakistan. It also seeks to make a distinction between 'popular Islam' that is practiced in 
Pakistan and 'institutionalized or political Islam', which dominates the public sphere.  It 
will also attempt to analyze the historical processes by which the institutionalized 
unitary form of religion has, in some contexts assumed a qualitative role in Pakistan's 
social life, as part of a process of secularization that remains dependant upon state 
projects (Zaman 2002; Iqtidar 2011). In this way state management of religion has 
encouraged a radical Islamic identity which has come to dominate the public sphere in 
Pakistan and overshadowed popular forms of religion which are more tolerant and 
diverse. This paper will attempt to underline a vast gap between the imagined and lived 
religion and highlight the fact that a grounded traditional Islamic identity actually 
impedes radicalization in the society. It also argues that invocations of 'increasing 
radicalism' and 'fundamentalism' within the Pakistani society are misrepresentations. 
This paper will attempt to highlight certain factors such as an increased access to 
education and the new media can facilitate the expression of popular forms of 
religiosity.  
 
      Given the nature of the contested public sphere, this study seeks to meaningfully 
analyze and identify various socio-political categories and characterizations along with 
                                                                                                                                                 
5
 Ebrahim, Zofeen T., Taliban-Style Law Passed in Pakistan.  Dawn .July 21, 2005.  
6
 Zaidi ,S. Akbar. Military, Civil Society and democratization in Pakistan. Vanguard Books, 2011. p 212-213 , see 
also Ali, Tariq. The Duel. Scribner. 2008 p 23-34  
 5 
the assumptions that they uphold in the context of Pakistan. This research therefore 
contends with such categories and concepts as 'modes of agency', ‘structures of possible 
actions’ and even as 'articulations of power'.7 In this sense it argues that the generic 
liberal, secular, Islamic, fundamentalist categories (among others) distort actual lived 
reality by forcing it to confine to the constrictive Western concepts and distinctions. 
(Kaviraj 2005; Mahmood 2009).  
 
      Eventually this paper argues that these catagories are all elite discourses, which do 
not matter much to ordinary people in Pakistan. Furthermore the commonly assumed 
dichotomy between Islam, on the one hand, and modernity and secularism, on the other 
holds little meaning for the vast majority of Muslim who refuse to see their development 
as a choice between Islam and modernity. (Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005; Hasan 2002) 
However when such categories have been used by the Pakistani elite as 'articulations of 
power' and ' forceful policy prescriptives' they subvert social reality and constrain the 
agency of the masses. This paper will therefore attempt to analyze the way in which the 
rigid opposition between secular and sacred space, that seems so inherent to everyday 
practices of modern life, is complicated by the 'other ways of being' in Pakistan where 
religious diversity cuts across the contested and opposed categories upheld by the 
Westernized liberal elite and the orthodox Islamist elements. 
 
Conflation of Categories:  
        
       Given this context this study will attempt to examine an extensive confluence and 
misrepresentation among the modern analytical categories that are in common currency 
in Pakistan.  For example when one talks about being 'liberal' in Pakistan one can make a 
distinction between what can be called the 'lifestyle liberalism'8 with the actual notion of 
'liberalism' in the classical sense which espouses equal rights, democracy and rejects 
imperialism. In the contexutalization of the Pakistan civil society it can be pointed out 
that the 'lifestyle liberals' are 'undemocratic', willing to support military dictatorships 
and endorse the imperialist agenda because it resonates with their Western values. It has 
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also been said that in Pakistan 'liberalism' is not really a reflection of a 'political 
philosophy', but of 'personal choices of morality' because the Pakistani 'liberals' espouse 
the Leftist liberal values of 'free speech' and 'rule of law', but  do not want to instill the 
economic and democratic mechanisms to ensure them or practice the egalitarian values 
such as the distribution of power and wealth which underline 'liberalism' in the literal 
sense. (Lieven 2011; Ali 2008; Hasan 2002)  
        
         There is further conflation between the categories of 'secularism' and 
'secularization', specially in the authoritarian context that is used incessantly by the 
ruling elite in Pakistan. For example, recently the Musharraf regime promoted a version 
of  'secularism' which was conflated with the process of 'secularization' or the 'secular' 
ideal and modernity interchangeably. In many cases it seems that what was being called 
'secularism' within Musharraf's Enlightened Moderation narrative was primarily the 
total absence of religion not only in the political realm but in the social, cultural sense as 
well, which is not 'secularism' at all but rather a consequence of 'secularization'. 
According to some definitions however, secularism must be liberal and autocratic 
regimes cannot be secular (Taylor 2007; 2012). In this sense then it would be contentious 
to identify Musharraf as 'secular' or 'liberal' as is done generally in Pakistan. In order to 
understand these contradictions it seems relevant for the sake of analysis to question 
and make distinctions between the phraseology that is used to articulate these positions. 
A re-evaluation may unsettle existing assumptions but might allow us to meaningfully 
understand these positions and put them into proper social context.  
 
'Lifestyle Liberalism' : 
 
      While it is easy to identify and classify the radical Islamist groups in the spectrum of 
socio-religious polarization it is difficult to characterize and identify the 'liberals' in 
Pakistan as such. In many ways the term liberal seems to be a 'misnomer' in Pakistan 
where 'liberalism' is not really a reflection of a 'political philosophy', but of 'personal 
choices of morality'. In Pakistan what defines the 'liberals', is not a desire for more 
complex freedoms and principles of law and equity but their liberal lifestyle choices 
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which are often characterized with elitist, hedonistic Westernized values. (Ali 2008) In 
this sense the Pakistani liberals can be identified as 'lifestyle liberals'.9 
        Comparing such proclivity with the classical Western liberal framework, which 
uphold equal rights in matters of life, liberty and property, and rejects imperialism and 
state intrusion into the lives of individuals, it seems clear that what the 'lifestyle liberals'  
espouse is not liberalism in the true sense. Liberalism as a distinct philosophical 
tradition, employs the concept of 'natural rights' and the 'social contract' to reject 
absolutism in government, asserts that rulers are subject to the consent of the governed, 
and that private individuals have a fundamental right to all civil liberties (Mahmood 
2009; Ali 2008). None of these characteristics can be said to be realistically affirmed by 
the liberals in Pakistan, since they have incessantly displayed political opportunism and 
openly collaborated with autocratic regimes when it suited their purposes. In this sense 
for these liberals the 'lifestyle' liberalism takes precedence over political liberalism.10 
Such complicity in supporting dictatorships was witnessed recently during the eight 
year long rule of General Musharraf, whose Westernized 'lifestyle' and socially and 
culturally liberal agenda was in resonance with the 'lifestyle liberals'. The 'liberals' 
support not only the dictatorships but also democratic governments in suppressing 
religious groups and manifestly trampling over civil liberties. ( Zaidi 2011; Ali 2008)  
 
         Classical liberalism believes in free markets and the equal distribution of wealth 
and property. By contrast, in Pakistan, a different variety of 'liberalism' is associated 
with the 'ruling elite', who enjoy unprecedented levels of wealth, power and education, 
but have never considered it their responsibility as the best educated and most 
privileged in society to contribute to its development. Such liberalism can thus be 
equated with 'elitism' which exists in many forms ranging from the feudal, traditional 
and economic elites, who control  a disproportionate amount of wealth and property in 
Pakistan , but continue to follow and implement policies which protects their status quo 
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and continually marginalizes the general population in socio-economic terms.11 Many 
'liberal' commentators in the West describe the liberals in Pakistan as being at 
'loggerheads with the common citizens of the country' and attribute social dissonance in 
the country to the 'divide between the majority of the people of Pakistan and their 
corrupt, uncaring rulers'.12 These Westernized elite have been responsible for creating 
the economic, political and social conditions which have sustained a cycle of social 
despair in Pakistan over the decades but they have little interest in the reconstruction of 
the state because they have the most to lose if power is truly exercised by the people 
(Zaidi 2011; Ali 2008). For this reason they have never meaningfully supported 
indigenous politics or democracy in the country which would allow expression to the 
non-liberal segments of the society.13 
        
        In the classical sense liberalism identifies itself against conservatism but many 
'liberals' who are part of the traditional elite in Pakistan have incessantly shown a 
preference for tribal conservatism rather than the state defined Islamic laws, especially 
at junctures when the religion would uphold individual rights and distribution of 
wealth in the liberal sense. Nelson and Wilder has shown through their work in central 
Punjab how many traditional landowners prefer the tribal customs over Islamic laws 
when it comes to issues such as the distribution of land or the right of inheritance of 
women. ( Nelson 2009: Wilder 1999)  Inversely Zaman and Iqtidar's works shows that 
the religious classes uphold modernity and seek to restructure traditions.(Iqtidar 2011; 
Zaman 2002) In this sense the 'unpredictability' of the correlates of faith and partisanship 
therefore force one to be cautious about quick generalizations about the political stance 
of 'believers'.14 Therefore conservatism is not a good yardstick to measure religiosity 
since many conservative people are not manifestly religious or conversely religious 
people do not have to be conservative. In many instances religiously inclined Muslims 
also support modern, secular agenda (Iqtidar 2011; Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005) and in 
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other instances conservative, traditional people have sought strategies to circumvent 
Islamic laws. (Marsden 2007; Nelson2009; Iqtidar 2011)  
 
         Given the post-9/11 scenario the 'liberals' have also described themselves as 
'moderates', reflecting 'western labels' of 'alternatives to fundamentalism'.15 While in 
literal terms liberalism does symbolize moderation, in Pakistan however such 
'moderation' seems to have become another form of extremism with the liberals 
vehemently pursing a 'radical' agenda to enforce a particular interpretation of 
'Westernized values' in the society. 16  In the public perception then 'liberalism' has 
somewhat become synonymous with 'libertinism' so much so that it has been pointed 
out that one reason why so many people in Pakistan today try to avoid the label of 
'moderate' or 'liberal' is the perception of having  been 'sold out on their religion to the 
West and it's suffocating terminology'. 17 Instead of opposing foreign intervention as 
classical liberalism demands, the Pakistani liberals welcome it in order to protect their 
lifestyle from perceived threats. ( Lieven 2011; Zaidi 2011) It can be pointed out that on 
the one hand, the 'liberals' 'object to virulent fatwas by local clergy' but on the other, they 
'welcome diktats from foreign sources that fit into their liberal agendas',18 so much so 
that Western commentators characterize Pakistan's liberal elite as incessantly trying to 
'impress' and 'appease' West of their resonance with Western liberal ideology (Lieven 
2011, Marsden 2005). 
 
        Ironically, the greatest opposition against foreign intrusion and imperialism in 
Pakistan has come from the 'Islamic civil society'.19 whose agenda has shown remarkable 
resonance with classical liberalism.20  Historically, the liberal factions in Pakistan have 
also shown itself to be 'inflexible and uncompromising' in their political stance and 
thereby contributing further to more polarization in the society with their policies 
(Iqtidar 2011; Nasr 1994). In comparison the 'religious elite' has made more compromises 
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and has been 'more sensitive to the changes in the structure of Pakistani society' than the 
ruling elite, a fact that does not reflect positively on the 'liberals'.21  The categories of 
'radical right and 'liberal left' are also unwittingly used to describe both sides of the 
divide. In these characterizations the right wing radicals are unchanging and rigid 
whereas the liberal progressives factions are 'willing to change'. (Husain 2012; Siddiqa 
2011; Ahmed 2002) But here again it can be argued that such categorizations distort 
reality in Pakistan where many liberals have been inflexible and rigid in their views, 
especially of those who disagree with them and have a different worldview while the so 
called radicals have sought to change the existing status quo by repeatedly taking up 
liberal positions. (Ali 2008; Lieven 2011; Iqtidar 2011)  
        However where the 'lifestyle liberals' do find resonance with classical liberalism is 
in its secular proclivity for the separation of religion and state, and its relegation of 
religion to the private sphere. A manifest reliance on secularism is clearly one of the 
central characteristic of liberalism. 'Liberal secularism', as a principle of liberal state 
governance however entails not so much the abandonment of religion altogether, as the 
'liberals' in Pakistan seek, but its ongoing regulation through a variety of state and civic 
institutions. Infact it has been proved that the process of secularization as a stable 
endpoint does not result in the 'disappearance of religion' (Katznelson and Jones 2010). 
The right to religious liberty is infact widely regarded as a crowning achievement of 
secular-liberal democracies that guarantees the peaceful co-existence of religiously 
diverse populations (Mahmood 2008). Given this context a great normative value is 
added to the supremacy of 'secularism' by the so-called liberals and dictatorial regimes 
in Pakistan but it is questionable if what they seek to implement is indeed a liberal form 
of secularism.  
 
Secularism and Pakistan:  
 
        In the light of the above argument it would be useful to analyze the attributes of 
liberal secularism and compare them with the characteristics that constitute 'secularism' 
in Pakistan presently. In literal terms the distinct character of liberal secularism lies in its 
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'forceful commitment to the principle of religious freedom' and liberal secular states, 
while they regulate religious life, must 'constantly counterbalance this regulation with 
an individual’s right to practice his/her religion freely without coercion and state 
intervention'. 22 However such liberal secularism has been elusive in Pakistan because 
the state suppresses religious freedoms in various ways and instead of separating 
religion from the affairs of the state it manifestly uses religion to legitimize political 
agenda. In recent times for instance the project of 'Enlightened Moderation', stylized by 
the former President Musharraf, was imposed in Pakistan as a pivotal policy which 
promoted such a version of 'secularism'. Musharraf described himself as a 'liberal' and 
'secular' Muslim and his version of 'secularism' sought to 'weed out religion' not just in 
the polity, but generally from the public sphere, by placing checks on religiosity and 
thereby intruding into the socio-cultural life of the citizens. (Hassan 2007; Iqtidar 2011) 
In doing so it was not only enforcing 'secularism' in an authoritarian fashion, it was 
forcefully enforcing 'secularization' as 'a broader social process through the forcible 
privatization of religion' (Bilgrami 2012).  
 
         It is well worth making a distinction here between the process of 'secularization', 
the 'secular' ideal and 'secularism' as a political doctrine. In the classical sense 
'secularization' refers to the canonical process whereby a religious person has 'left the 
cloister to return to the 'world' and its temptations, becoming thereby a 'secular' person. 
(Katznelson and Jones 2010) 'Secularization' extends as a process within a society at 
large through its cultural and intellectual life which entails 'the migration of a religious 
calling to the worldly sphere' while secularism, which is a narrower notion and is 
restricted to the polity.23  According to the theory of secularization which emerged an 
'unchallenged truth' of the twentieth century social sciences, secularization was taken to 
mean 'the waning of belief in God' and referred to the decline of overt demonstrations of 
religiosity and religious values in personal and public life.24 In this way the recession of 
religion was seen as an inevitable sociological process which was built upon sweeping 
post-Enlightenment expectations in which religion was 'replaced' with science and 
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secularization (Katznelson and Jones 2010). It was averred that a universal contraction of 
the 'capability, ambition and effect' of religious institutions would consequently led to 
the weakening of religious faith and practice due to 'social differentiation, 
rationalization and social knowledge' associated with modernity.25  
 
       Presently in Pakistan the concept of secularism seems to be conflated or even 
equated with the notions of the ‘secular’ ideal and the process of ‘secularization’. 
However the secularization is largely 'irrelevant' to the idea of secularism and the 
enforcement of 'secularization' is not necessarily a sign that 'secularism' must exist. 
Similarly polities may be predominantly 'secularist' with or without the society at large 
being proportionately 'secularized'. (Bilgrami 2012) This can be easily assessed from the 
case of Pakistan where, even when the state has had a manifestly secularist outlook the 
people are not overtly secularized in terms of the surrender of religious habits of dress 
or showing lack of religiosity in the public sphere 26. However there does exist an 
underlying anxiety, which has been described as a 'sense of urgency' to declare oneself a 
secularist in present times, that manifests itself as a sort of 'a social blackmail' that 
demands to know if one is either for or against secularism. (Mahmood 2009) It is argued 
that there is 'an essential kernel' to secularism that must be preserved and defended 
from religious extremism and backwardness. However the crucial problem with this 
kind of thinking is its assumption that a secular worldview is the opposite of a religious 
one, where each is grounded in a 'distinct and irreconcilable epistemology' against the 
other.27 In Pakistan, as in the Muslim world in general, secularism is also equated with 
atheism (ladinyat) and rejection of religion (dahriyat). This is so even in the absence of any 
theological opposition within Islam toward secularism. (Asad 2003; Iqtidar 2011) 
 
        However the religious and the secular are not so much 'immutable essences' or 
'opposed ideologies' and in a literal sense 'secularity does not imply the absence but the 
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diversification of religion and religious possibility'. 28 The 'secular' ideal has also been 
taken to imply hostility to religion but it can only be defined as 'a consciously non-
religious position'. As a condition, secularism is a heterogeneous position which 
'broadens religions variety' by being mindful of the continued importance but the 
'changed status' of religion. and therefore it must be 'responsive' to religion and not 
hostile to it. 29  Secularism in the literal sense therefore cannot be characterized as 
'obsessively seeking religion out as a target' or trying to 'polemically remove it root and 
branch from public life', in all its social, cultural and intellectual aspects nor can it be 
seen as being 'dismayed by' or 'concerned' with the presence of religiosity in the 
society.30 Secularism is actually dependent on religion so much so that whatever the 
understanding of religion is in common currency, 'secularism defines itself and has a 
parasitic meaning which is partially elaborated around it' (Bilgrami 2012). In this sense if 
religion is equated with the unitary political Islam that dominates the public sphere as in 
Pakistan, then secularism will inevitably identify itself around it and seek to control  it.  
 
            In Pakistan's context the state repeatedly shown an indifference to popular religion 
while at the same time allowing a particular version of political Islam to forcefully 
articulate itself in the public sphere  for political purposes, ironically at the cost of 
stifling other expressions of religiosity. (Hassan 2008; Nasr 1994) Such circumstances can 
attest for the fact that secularism is 'not a guarantee for the ideals of tolerance in all 
contexts'. (Bilgrami 2012, Iqtidar 2011) It can also be pointed out that 'secularism can 
often be and is accompanied by bad political and institutional arrangements'.31  It is 
therefore worthwhile to question the point and rationale for secularism when the 
benefits that secularism seeks to provide cannot be not seen necessarily as advantageous 
and also to assess whether tolerance and plurality could be achieved by other social and 
political arrangements that were not secularist. Bilgrami points out that secularism does 
not seem to have a philosophical right on its side that makes it rise by the light of reason 
over other opposing claims. (Bilgrami 2012) 
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        More often than not, however, instead of any critical inquiry into a historical 
understanding or the value of secularism is hurriedly abandoned for the 'moral 
superiority of secularism through recourse to the familiar 'Enlightenment rhetoric' of 
freedom, human creativity, and autonomy in which religion is contrasted against the 
irrationality and backwardness of religious practices and overt religiosity correlates with 
insufficient modernization and is overtly seen as a measure of the primitiveness of 
society. (Katznelson and Jones 2010) Groups that are culturally repugnant to liberal 
academics continue to be studied as anti-modern, fundamentalist, backward and 
irrational(Mahmood 2008). In this sense the tradition of critical theory seems infused 
with 'a suspicion, if not dismissal', of 'religion’s metaphysical and epistemological 
commitments'.32 Given this context the notions of Islam’s inability to secularize have 
continued to saturate international debates about secularism and lead to conclusions 
such as that Islam is 'secularization-resistant'. 33  The distinction secularism makes 
between 'religious faith' and the 'secular argument' which limits faith and ritual to a 
strict private domain and suppresses 'complex registers of persuasion, judgment and 
discourse operative in public life' which continue to function even within secularism. 
(Mahmood 2008) Secularism in its current understanding seems inevitably intertwined 
with a Western understanding of the process of secularization which emphasizes 
privatization of religion and the separation of spheres but by this emphasis on privacy 
and separation, religion is sometimes 'misleadingly' removed altogether from the public 
sphere. (Katznelson 2010) However, despite all the structural forces, the legitimate 
pressures, and the many valid reasons pushing religion in the modern, secular world 
into the private sphere, religion continues to have and will likely continue to have a 
public dimension.34 
 
           In this context the process of secularization gives rise to two distinctive and 
contrasting  outlooks towards religion, that is 'freedom from belief' as well as a 'freedom 
                                                 
32 Mahmood , Saba . Is Critique Secular. Public Culture, ISSN 0899-2363, , Volume 20, Issue 3, 10/2008. 
33
 Gellner, Ernest.  'Islam and Marxism: Some Comparison', International Affairs 67. 1991. 
34 Casanova ,Jose. Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press, 1994. p.13, 66. 
 15 
to believe'.35 These two divergent outlooks can be clarified with the distinction between 
'political' and 'existential' secularism, where 'political secularism upholds the freedom to 
believe while 'existential secularism' seeks freedom from belief.36 In a classical sense 
'political secularism' connotes a historical, institutional and normative process by which 
collective public power developed a justification separate from a religious foundation. 
'Political' secularism is thus a privatization of religion and separation of public and 
private affairs and can be viewed as both a process of change which is embodied in 
institutions and beliefs grounded in non-religious legitimating authority, yet 'one that 
takes religion seriously' and continues to be cognizant of it.37 'Existential secularism' on 
the other hand identifies with some version of the ideology of secularism which leads to 
the decline of religious belief and practice but it seeks the disappearance of personal 
religious faith altogether.38 It is significant to also note that existential secularism is 
'irrelevant' and 'unnecessary' for political secularism. ( Katznelson and Jones 2010) 
 
             In Pakistan 'existential secularism' can be seen as being upheld by the category of 
'lifestyle liberals' who do not always believe in political secularism which recognizes 
religion as an important element of social and political interaction. More often than not 
existential secularism resonates with the process of secularization, which marks a highly 
general and dispersed social, intellectual and cultural phenomena and processes 
including a stance against religion that requires redirection of either personal belief or a 
range of personal and cultural habits of dress or diet. With the exception of Zia, most 
political leaders like Ayub, Bhutto and Musharraf could be easily characterized as 
'existential secularists'. However while rejecting religion privately these 'existential 
secularists' brought religion in the political realm by appropriating political Islam for 
their own purposes, which by and large placed constraints on other forms of religious 
expression in the society. (Hassan 2007; Qadeer 2006) 
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The Politics of Secularism: 
 
           In this sense secularism is not 'an arbitrary stipulation' when it is imposed. 
Bilgrami points out that in the politics of secularism in current times, 'secularism has its 
point and meaning, not in some de-contextualized philosophical argument, but only in 
contexts that owe to specific historical trajectories, with specific political goals to be 
met'39.  
          In the colonial contexts in South Asia secularism has played an 'intolerant' and 
'authoritarian' role. The separation of church and state, as a definitive process of 
secularization with a reduction  in religions power, was essentially a 'modern western 
political development which was not necessarily required in South Asia nor did the 
Muslims' situation necessitate it. (Kaviraj 2010) In historic terms, Islam did not produce a 
comparable tension between the church and state because it did not have an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy comparable to Christianity. Therefore in Muslim communities 
there was no 'need' for aggressive secularization that insists on sharp divisions between 
church and state. The forms of religious codification introduced by the British for 
administrative reasons, reshaped the religion producing radical versions of Islam. 
(Kaviraj 2010) In this sense secularization was a harsh imposition which did not lead 
unconditionally to the creation of the 'liberal subject' but rather it invoked a severe 
reaction in the form of religious fundamentalism and created a static unitary form of 
Islam. 40  
 
          Given this background and the consequent manifestation of fundamentalism in 
Pakistan it seems meaningful to 'rethink the secular'. (Bilgrami 2012; Mahmood 2008) 
Bilgrami makes the 'uncontroversial' claim that secular liberalism is one truth among 
many' and that alternatives to the basic ideals within a liberal framework, such as those 
of fundamental rights and constitutional commitments, which exist beyond secularism. 
(Bilgrami 2012) Another option in the current impasse is to reject the liberal framework 
                                                 
39
 Bilgrami, Akeel.  Secularism: Its Content and Context. Economic & Political Weekly. January, 2012  
40
 Kaviraj , Sudipta. 'On Thick and Thin Religion: Some Critical Reflections on the Secularization Theory' 
also Iqtidar, Humeira. Secularizing Islamists?: Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa in urban Pakistan . 
University of Chicago Press, 2011 
 
 17 
and turn to some sort of indigenism which suggests that the historical trajectory of each 
society is incomparably peculiar, and should be analyzed as far as possible by its own 
'internal' or indigenous concepts.(Nandy 1998) However such strategy seems rather 
'ahistorical' in suggesting essentialized, nativist categories given the centuries long 
interaction with modern colonialism. In this sense it seems impossible not to engage 
with the modern liberal framework because traditionally South Asia did not have any 
political ideals or institutional practices comparable to modern conceptions. Therefore 
the political history of South Asia atleast from the mid 19th century onwards cannot be 
understood except in terms of a modern history. (Kaviraj 2005) This is not to say that the 
West is the only 'true subject of history' but because of the extensive Western political 
and cultural influence, the vocabulary that is available for post-colonial societies like 
Pakistan is limited to what is defined by a Western experience. Therefore those who seek 
to oppose it still have to engage with it in conceptual and structural terms. (Hallaq 2009; 
Kaviraj 2005; Chatterjee 2004) This can be assessed from experience of the secularizing 
Islamists in Pakistan (Iqtidar 2011), a phenomenon which seems hard to explain given 
the 'historic resistance' to secularism in Pakistan (Ahmed 2010; Qadeer 2006). 
         
        Some of the constitutive assumptions of secularism, particularly those that enable 
the distinction between 'enlightened religiosity' and its more 'dangerous forms' allow 
secularist regimes to enforce secularism as a measure of protection against the latter. 
(Mahmood 2008) Such distinctions also underwrite the current U.S. government’s 
attempts to intervene politically and strategically in the Muslim world. Secularism in its 
current understanding has therefore become inevitably intertwined with a modern and 
Western understanding of the process of secularization as a project whose imposition by 
dictatorships is tolerated as' a lesser of two evils by Western governments and liberal 
political audiences' (Bilgrami 2012). Such insights can provide an explanation for the 
way that Musharraf's secular military rule has been so well received in the liberal circles 
in Pakistan as well as the West (Zaidi 1999). However when secularization' does not 
have any substantive engagement with the structures of the society which it seeks to 
reform it becomes 'hegemonic' and autocratic in nature.  (Iqtidar 2011; Bilgrami 2012)  
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Authoritarian Secularism:  
 
        Authoritarian secularism in the Muslim world has worked by diminishing the 
visibility of Islam in the public sphere, including restricting people's religiosity by 
manipulating and repressing popular religion. While authoritarian secularism has made 
claims to 'liberalize' Islam, in all the cases it has been upheld, the end result has been the 
suppression of the people by oppressive, dictatorial regimes. (Katznelson and Jones 
2010) Clearly the notion of secularism has been appropriated by these regimes to 
perpetuate subversive political arrangements and in this sense authoritarian secularism 
is not an 'ideological problem but one of methodology' where the state does not engage 
meaningfully with particular modalities of religious practice and secularism comes into 
the service of real-politik or corrupt ends. (Bilgrami 2012;  Mahmood 2008) 
 
          Such adverse political arrangements and institutions have been seen as 'a reason 
and occasion to question and redefine secularism' so that they cannot either be seen as 
possessing 'agentative liberal characteristics' or they don't count as secularist polities at 
all. According to some view points secularism should be incompatible with determined 
authoritarian efforts at imposing secularization. (Taylor 2012) In other words given such 
a view secularism cannot be autocratic and authoritarian. However there are still others 
views who believe that not all secularism need be liberal secularism and uphold that 
'The authoritarian properties of regimes do nothing to cancel the secularist nature of the 
regime, but they do cancel the liberal nature of the regime'.41 In this view authoritarian 
secular regimes can not be described as 'liberal' but can be secular or none of the two. 
Both viewpoints in any case remove the agentative connotations associated with 
secularism.   
 
      In Pakistan's context, for example, the recent Musharraf regime which identified 
itself as being 'secular',42 would  by Taylor's account would not be secular or liberal. 
Conversely by Bilgrami's definition it could be considered secular but not 'liberal'. Such 
arguments can  sufficiently contest the way in which this regime characterized itself as 
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'secular' and 'liberal'. This discussion can also provide an insight into the way that the 
'life-style liberals' in Pakistan have repeatedly supported autocratic regimes with great 
ease, because none of these actors follow 'liberalism' in the true sense. They might have 
secular aspirations but they do not practice secularism in the literal sense with their 
open hostility to any form of religiosity. (Hassan 2008; Iqtidar 2010)  
 
State Management of Religion in Pakistan: 
 
        Ironically it has been some of the most secular rulers such as Musharraf and Bhutto, 
who have insisted on identifying Pakistan as an 'Islamic republic' and 'not a secular 
state' 43 , for the sake of political expediency. Showing excessive opportunism in the face 
of political unpopularity, the ruling elite in Pakistan have used Islam as a strategy to 
legitimize themselves. The difference between the policies of civil and military regimes 
has been insignificant in this regard. Therefore in the state management of religion and 
their engagement with the political Islamists groups, the civilians have continued in the 
footsteps of their military counterparts.44  Appeasing engagement with the religious 
elements has thereby allowed the ruling regimes to secure their own position but has 
also led to the formulation of harmful policies cloaked in Islamic rhetoric. Ultimately, 
the way political Islam has developed in Pakistan, where politicians are insistent on 
keeping the religious orthodoxy happy or by providing an environment where religious 
groups were allowed to flourish or both - has contributed to the increased strength of 
these groups and a particular kind of Islam in Pakistan. 45 
 
       The identification of the state with a vision of 'a unitary Islamic community' and its 
association with the projection of a Muslim nation, have empowered the assertion of the 
state’s right to manage and control the operation of religion in Pakistan. (Iqtidar and 
Gilmartin 2010) The correlation between the state and the 'religious elite' can be 
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explained in the context of the 'High Islam' vs. 'Low Islam' debate, where 'Low Islam' is 
associated with the 'masses' and the puritanical textual and rule oriented 'High Islam' 
has always been associated with the orthodox religious elite. The secular elite continued 
to use the orthodox 'High Islam' to validate themselves and consequently elevate the 
puritanical clergy to a superficial, symbolic prominence. In the process the tolerant and 
diverse 'Low Islam' of the masses which has a rural and spiritual thrust, has continued 
to disappear from the public sphere and is relegated to the private realm. But this is not 
to say that it does not flourish in the private sphere. (Hasan 2001; Lieven 2011; Marsden 
2005)  
 
         The state management of religion or the political use of 'High Islam' is therefore an 
elite tradition of manipulating religion for narrow political ends that dates back to the 
early years of Pakistan. It is also a strategy to  divide and rule the society, by juntas that 
have lacked a constituency.46  Earlier in 1953 the Punjab's unpopular Chief Minister 
Daultana played a major role in the Anti-Ahmadiya agitation by supporting the 
religious right. President Ayub's campaign against Fatima Jinnah in the 1962 used 
religion to discredit a woman's candidacy. Similarly Bhutto's 'Islamic' concessions to 
save his government in the last days of his rule are indicative of his appropriation of 
religion to consolidate his political power. However the Zia regime's contribution to this 
tradition was qualitatively different from anything that preceded it. In seeking 
legitimation and social base for his rule, Zia's Islamization policies manifestly 
encouraged orthodox practices in the public sphere thereby allowing fundamentalism to 
strengthen it's institutional base and violently suppressing popular religion (Qadeer 
2006; Ghazali 1996).  
          
          In the 1980's the US sponsorship of an international jihad further provided the 
framework for proliferation of arms and sanctification of organized violence on religious 
grounds.47 The introduction of the blasphemy laws, Hudood ordinances, public hangings 
within the process of Islamization created 'an ethos of brutality' in which weaker 
sections of the society became fair game by way of serving as instruments to establish 
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the Islamic credentials of the state as well as the privileged claims of the more powerful 
sections of society. An aura of symbolic religiosity was created in the public sphere 
which promoted overt expressions of religiosity, when in earlier times, religion was 
largely a private matter which need not be demonstrated in public. 48  Such public 
proclamations of orthodox religiosity overshadowed popular religion in the public 
sphere and insisted upon a unitary religious identity, over which it asserted its claim. 
Ultimately the project of Islamization sharpened denominational identities, cultural 
cleavages and precipitated institutional dissonance and divergence of values and norms. 
In the process peaceful social co-existence was made increasingly difficult due to the 
state management of religion. (Iqtidar 2011) 
 
        Militant sectarian groups emerged as a corollary of the state sponsored 'Islamization 
project', employed as a political strategy, which privileged religion as understood by one 
sect.49 The theocratic promises of a unitary Islam in the political sphere had the effect of 
provoking sectarian conflicts and providing a fertile base for sectarianism to grow and 
prosper. Religiosity rather than religion have continued to be placed at a premium and 
this had a significant bearing on the rise of a certain class which had access to the 
resources of the state and learnt to manipulate the levers of power. (Qadeer 2006; 
Ghazali 1996) Consequently violence practicing groups, sectarian parties and militant 
organizations of all shades and affiliations, which materialized during Zia's rule, 
emerged as the state's competitors and have continued to flourish and presently exist as 
a nuisance on the fringes of the mainstream society. (Nasr 2009; Qadeer 2006; Ghazali 
1996) Even after the end of the  Islamization period, political Islam did not retreat as 
easily as the military and continued to dominate the public sphere. The dominance of 
this form of religiosity and the accentuation of multiple forms of violence associated 
with it, which have historically signaled 'the decline of the state, its legitimacy, 
ideological mooring, and institutional will and capacity to govern', continued in 
Pakistan .50 
 
                                                 
48 Qadeer, Mohammad Abdul, Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation. 2006  p. 175  
49
 Mian Zia and Ahmad, Iftikhar. Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crises of State and Society. 
Mashal Publishers. 1997 
50 Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Islam, Christianity, Modernity, Stanford University Press. 2003 
 22 
          The gradual weakening of the state seems to have become a common phenomenon 
where the post-colonial states have lost substantial legitimacy in what has been 
described as 'a rising tide of undirected and uncontrollable social aspiration'.51  The 
notion of the modern state as a 'distant, second-order, spectral, moral entity' allows the 
distinction between the ‘state’ and ‘society’ to be understood as an institution of the 
imagination.(Kaviraj 1997) The state negotiates its claims to authority as 'an imagined 
locus of power' existing outside society, even as it exercises power through interventions 
in the society and claims unitary authority as integral to its assertion of a legitimate 
interest in acting upon religion rather than being controlled by it ( Iqtidar and Gilmartin 
2010) Dominant groups actively manipulate the state for patronage and favors, and the 
state’s monopoly of force is undermined by the numerous armed religious groups who 
have forceful political agendas of their own. However the state’s porousness as an actual 
institution also makes it susceptible to being manipulated by forces of religion  in a way 
that the state gradually loses its 'attributes of authority'. (Asad 2003) In this sense 'the 
Pakistani state can be seen as being weak and society as being very strong'.52  
           
       Furthermore such 'imagination' of a static Islamic state has been in pervasive tension 
with the fragmented operation of the state and with the expectations of the Pakistani 
society.53 Competing ideas and power interests exert new pressures that facilitate the 
emergence of new configurations of state, society and religion out of existing traditions. 
That is to say that there is manifest conflict between 'the aspirations of the state and 
society' which creates 'inefficiency, exasperation and arbitrariness' in everyday life in 
Pakistan (Qadeer 2008; Hasan 2002). These points of conflict between state and society in 
the public sphere which create social and political tensions can be described as 
'normative paradoxes' in the Pakistani society because of which ‘religion’ becomes both 
a source of imagined unity and of division. 54  
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The Reformulation of  Islam:  
 
         These perspectives reflect that the state's intervention in the society produces 'new 
subjectivities and norms' tied to religious practice and the pattern that emerges is that of 
increasing political and social 'entanglement' which cannot proceed along strictly linear 
formations and inevitably produces 'new forms of religion'. 55 Through this process of 
entanglement emerges a 'modular conception of religiosity' and a 'concomitant religious 
subject' that habituates various liberal discourses in present times. (Asad 2003; 
Mahmood 2006; Iqtidar 2011)  Such a modular conceptions, which are also prevalent in 
Pakistan, however tend to overlook the internal complexity of religion and sees it as a 
singular static concept.  
 
         Such static outlooks can be attributed to the 'Christian baggage' tied to the concept 
of religion, which of itself has a 'contested' and 'changing' history. (Anidjar 2009) The 
constitution of the modern state required the forcible redefinition of religion as an 
'intangible universal belief' and therefore whatever narrative of religion is adopted, its 
dominant understanding remains tied to a specific Christian history. (Asad 2003; 
Anidjar 2009)  From being a coherent set of practical rules attached to specific processes 
of power and knowledge, religion has come to be seen as an abstract, unified and 
universalized phenomenon in modern times.  This concept of religion has been also been 
described as 'a polemical concept whose relation to power is not merely derivative but 
inherent and dynamic, the product of unequal and conflicting forces at work within and 
around it '56. Religion is therefore 'an essential, asymmetric and contradictory moment in 
a series of acts, enactments and motions that constitute it as an object' in modern times.57 
This modern understanding of religion is hard to distangle from the actual conception of 
religion because of the 'modern knowledge' 58  that post-colonial societies such as 
Pakistan have of themselves.  
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          The modern reformulation of religion reconstitutes, reforms and recomposes it in 
'a field of possibilities' that range from self-conscious and powerful reassertion of 
militancy to laicism at the other, so much so that the meaning of religion becomes 'a 
plethora of possibilities'59 Furthermore there exists 'a large space' in-between secularism 
and religious fundamentalism which is occupied by various combinations and 
configurations of lived religion (Kaviraj 2010).  Therefore rather than talk about religion 
as a universalized abstraction and a generality, it should be seen as 'a combination of 
many institutional and ideational structures, intellectual systems, authoritative 
institutions and sets of ritual observances'.60  
 
           Islam is not an 'imagined monolith' as is usually asserted, but rather various 
national cultures, historical experiences, political trajectories, as well as class affiliation, 
produce different cultures and sub-cultures of Islam (Hallaq 2009) . Religious 
perceptions and practices across and within different Muslim nations are further 
comprised of people with 'various degrees of religious affiliations' and the strength and 
durability of Islamic identity has 'situational' and 'local' explanations. 61 Any 'absolutist 
projects of monolithic Islamic commitment', are therefore an exception in what can be 
described as 'a highly diverse and internally conflicted religious community'. 62 In short 
there are different ways of being a Muslim. Furthermore as Bayat points out 'Muslim 
societies' in general as concrete entities are 'never religious by definition', nor are their 
cultures confined to mere religion and so it seems irrelevant to reduce them to a single 
religious identity. (Bayat 2007) 
 
            In the same way Pakistan is home to a great diversity of Islamic thought, where 
different sectarian outlooks, diverse ethnicities and their corresponding variations of 
Islam which have been living along side with each other for hundreds of years as 
'identities within identities'.63 Different religious sects and communities have lived side 
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by side in relative peace and independence without having to prove the authenticity or 
the righteousness of their Islam, until recent times (Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005) Inspite 
of the socio-political pressures to adhere to 'a universal Islamic identity', enforced 
Islamization and the dominance of political Islam has not substantially altered the socio-
political realities in Pakistan. Ethnicity, community, family and kinship, which have 
been described as the 'building blocks' of the Pakistani society, invariably take 
precedence over any imagined Islamic unity (Qadeer 2006; Lieven 2011). This can be 
assessed from the distinction of public and private faith during and after the Zia era. A 
survey of the nature of religosity during the Islamization period suggests that 'clear 
chasm between politically expressed belief and private behavior' and that during this era 
there was a' manifest divide between the way the people saw religion and the way it 
was enforced officially through the state'.64 So much so that 'people remained indifferent 
to the political aims of Islamization' and the project 'had no discernible impact on the 
spiritual and moral life of the people'.65 However inspite of the fact that popular religion 
was resistant to politicized Islam, the institutionalized Islamist rhetoric remained 
unscathed by the lack of personal  commitment toward it and continued to dominate the 
public sphere. (Qadeer 2006 ; Ali 2008) 
 
          In this context it seems clear that no unifying religious identity or force seems to be 
powerful enough to unite this diversity into a whole and 'every effort to unite people 
behind a single religious cause has failed'.66 So when Islam is described as an 'anchor' of 
Pakistan's social life and 'a foundational social institution',67  such viewpoint refer to a 
multiplicity of religious expression, which have been described as 'sources of internal 
resilience' in Pakistan.68 While the urban Islamists are caught up in ideological battles in 
the public sphere at the grassroots the popular religion of the Pakistani society is 
somewhat 'liberal' and 'tolerant'.69 Clear indications of this are the repeated rejection of 
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Islamist and their orthodox religion at the electoral polls and the consistent reverence for 
the Sufi culture (Lieven 2011, Werbner 2004, Marsden 2005).  
 
           Historically a form of religious tolerance has existed in South Asia which can be 
identified as 'thick' religion. This 'thick' religion was based on 'firm religious belief, 
attentive ritualistic observances, cognitive modesty, recognition of religious pluralism 
and social tolerance', and can be seen a conventional notion of religiosity which is 
different from 'new religious ideas'.70 The 'thickness' of religion can be described as 'a 
catalogue of beliefs about large and small things, all of which are crucial to the practice 
of their particular faith' that is centered around small group and community identities.71  
In this context the most significant implication of thick religion is its effect on the 
'calculus of identity' which is the reason why thick religion cannot be understood 
meaningfully in the modern liberal discourse that makes small communities forcefully 
affiliate with a large identity.72  
 
           Such forced affiliation with a larger religious identity can be seen as 'thin' religion 
which primarily focuses on religious exclusion of 'other' communities from 'a sense of 
participating in a historically common and interactive religious culture by creating a 
distinct singular alienating monolithic religion' and in this sense the new thin religion, is 
'intolerant, unaccommodating, this worldly, political, unethical' and is opposed to the 
traditional forms of religiosity. 73  Clearly the traditional form of religion was more 
tolerant and diverse than its unitary modern manifestation, a fact which undercuts the 
liberal narrative which 'claims an ownership over religious tolerance' (Bilgrami 2012). 
Religious plurality and tolerance existed in the earlier South Asian society not because of 
liberal secularism but because of the thickness and diversity of religion. (Kaviraj 2010) 
 
         Secular modernity has created and promoted 'thin' Islam at the expense of the 
traditional 'thick' religion, allowing the new 'thin' form of religion to become 
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increasingly assertive. Kaviraj points out how the singular features of modern politics 
brought 'thin' religion into existence with the use of Western rationalist cognitive 
techniques, which led to the cognitive 'objectification' of space and populations. The 
forms of cultural codification and objectification initiated by the colonial state, and later 
adopted and transformed after 1947, have shaped the contemporary claims of cultural 
and religious collective entities and identities that are now a dynamic feature of 
Pakistan’s political culture (Lieven 2011). These techniques not only brought about new 
kinds of conflicts between new kinds of communities and created new alien identities 
through which all acts of individual or a group of Muslims came to be represented as 
distinctly 'Islamic'(Kaviraj 2010).  
 
          Furthermore the present liberal discourse, which manifestly informs the religious 
identification and categorization in Pakistan currently, fails to take into account the fact 
that 'sacred' Islamic injunctions are matters of struggle, of competing 'readings' or in 
other words they are 'matters of history'. 74 In a sense people define their own religion 
since ambiguity, multiple meaning and disagreement are embedded in the Quran and 
Hadith, and they identify their own 'truths' since individuals and groups with diverse 
orientations may find their own often conflicting truths in the very same scriptures. 
(Hallaq 2009; Bayat 2007) In Pakistan, the discourse on religion is also framed and 
measured in a teleological grid of progress and regress where religion is seen as being 
'backward'  and a high level of religiosity is seen as an 'indicator of social regression'.75 
In such constructions to be secular is to have agency and belief is to give up on one's 
agency.  
           
        The predominant discussion on religion in Pakistan reflects the liberal discourse 
which measures the quantity of belief in terms of visible marker of religious identity 
such as church/mosque attendance or sartorial preferences such as veiling etc. The 
religious conviction or the quantity of religion of the 'ordinary believer' is then 
questioned and compared with that of the orthodox religious extremists who  have come 
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to symbolize the epitome of religious passion and therefore  'levels of religiosity' are 
measured by the perverse criterion of how violent or radical one can become for one's 
belief.( Kaviraj 2010; Mahmood 2009;2008) Such measurements of faith and belief are 
clearly prejudiced and unreliable. A better criterion to understand increased or 
decreased religiosity is in terms of 'quality' of belief which is the 'texture' and the 
'substantive elements' of religion, instead of quantity that makes assumptions about less 
or more religion. 76  
 
            Officially sanctioned 'Islamic laws', 'political pieties' and 'absolutist assertions' of 
Islamic identity are problematic because they imply that the state decides what 
constitutes Islam, not the people. Such institutionalization of Islam, which turns the 
religion into an ideology that is rigid and singular, undermines it's inherent diversity 
and creates a new social category of a static 'Islam-inclined' subject. (Mahmood 2009) In 
this way the moral complexities of Islam are pushed aside for political expediency. 
While popular Islam easily operates within 'grey areas' and is historically grounded in 
'an acceptance of uncertainty', its association with ideology violently enforces a moral 
rigidity upon it (Hallaq 2009; Dabashi 2009). Consequently in such a relationship if and 
when an ideology is discredited or corrupted, then religion is tainted by association, as 
has happened in Pakistan. Such conflation of belief with ideology, and lack of agency is 
therefore a distortion of facts, as is the inability of such a discourse to differentiate 
between the 'quality' and 'quantity' of religion. However these are the criterion that 
continue to be employed to understand and measure religiosity in Pakistan. 
 
           Infact the supremacy and dominance of institutionalized, political Islam is seen as 
an inevitability and an unquestionable reality in Pakistan. (Rashid 2012; Husain 2012; 
Siddiqa 2011; Ahmed 2002) A particular reading of Pakistan's past and present continues 
to assert that when a state is carved out in the name of religion then it comes as ' no 
surprise that religion comes to dominate the public discourse and influence individual 
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thinking and social behavior'. 77  Such a reading of Pakistani history as a linear 
progression from religious nationalism to Islamism distorts and ignores the complexities 
the exist within the range of religious belief in Pakistan. A substantial amount of 
narratives of the post-partition Pakistan reveal a sense of contingency and highlight the 
range of options to articulate religion as being explored among the urban Muslim 
intelligentsia at the time rather than present a static and rigid institutionalized form of 
religion. (Qadeer 2006; Ali 2009; Karim 2010; Akbar S. Ahmed 1997) This information 
thus undercuts any teleological narrative of Pakistan’s history as simply the inevitable 
unfolding of the logic of Muslim nationalism and presents a narrative of potential 
possibility within religion. In reality the state management of religion created a new 
forms of institutionalized Islam, which were very different from the narratives 
envisioned by the founding fathers of Pakistan (Akbar S. Ahmed 1997). It is therefore 
problematic to attribute the rise of a certain kind of 'thin' religion to the fact that Islam is 
both officially and popularly seen as being the raison d'etre for the existence of Pakistan. 
This centrality of religion in the social life does gives Islam a special role in Pakistan's 
national identity but the 'thin' Islam that is 'state sanctioned' is different from the thick 
one that resonates with social values and aspirations. (Lieven 2011; Qadeer2006; 
Marsden 2005) However Islam is reduced to a caricature of its diversity when presented 
in the popular media portrayals and policy discussions so much so that ultimately 
Pakistan, Islam and orthodox Islamism are thoroughly conflated with each other. 
 
The Problem of Islam?  
 
            This leads one to question a generally accepted assumption that 'Islam' is 'a 
problem' in Pakistan. (Husain 2012; Siddiqa 2011; Ahmed 2002) In this regard it is 
significant therefore to highlight the distinction between 'thick' popular religious 
devotion and the 'thin' institutionalized religiosity. 'Personal or popular religion' are the 
beliefs held and mobilized by people at both collective and individual level, while the 
'institutional religion' is identified as the beliefs represented by the church or structured 
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religion.78 Personal religious commitments are therefore expressions of transcendental 
belief, personal identity, which cannot be measured or judged by their adherence to the 
larger national and group identities or captured by the institutional aspects of faith. The 
'problem' in Pakistan therefore is that the official narratives of institutionalized orthodox 
Islam, which dominate the public sphere, differ vastly from the actual lived religion . 
 
            The present discourse on religion in Pakistan currently continues to equate 
orthodox institutionalized religion with personal religious practices and does not 
differentiate 'thick' religion from 'thin' religion. The equation of 'personal faith' with 
'institutionalized' Islam incorrectly conflates political agenda with personal belief. In 
Pakistan many would argue that the personal religion is not a problem, but the orthodox 
'institutionalized' Islam which is manipulated by the state for its own ends, that is 
'disruptive' and 'constrictive'( Lieven 2011; Nasr 2009; Qadeer 2006). Given this context it 
is easy to understand how, within the notion of religion in common currency, 'Islam' has 
become equated with a radical interpretation of the religion, which does not represent 
the inclinations of the majority of Pakistanis. In this view the orthodox Islam of the 
Islamist parties is the 'religion' ordinary people in Pakistan follow. However in reality 
popular religion in Pakistan is based on tolerant values but is largely missing from the 
public sphere and the 'liberal Islamic' viewpoints which have sought a balance between 
tradition and modernity have been 'effectively driven of the public platform'.79  
 
         'Islam' also becomes a problem in Pakistan when it is identified as a 'monolith' and 
judged by the binary distinction between religion and secularism. As Lieven notes, 
'Given a choice between secularism and Islamism....Pakistanis will shrug them both 
off'. 80  This absence of a lack of identification with rigid criteria and assumptive 
categories however should not be seen as a 'weakness' because Muslims consider their 
Islamic identity as 'negotiable in the face of other values that they cherish' and is not a 
conflict between two set of values modern or religious.81 In the same way recent research 
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has shown  convincingly how a vast cross-section of the Pakistan society, such as people 
trained as ‘religious scholars’, supporters of ethnic-based parties in Sindh, and the 
disciples of Sufi saints in Kohat, the landowners in Punjab, the ordinary people of 
Chitral do not adhere to such dichotomies and are not 'simple automatons' 
instrumentally directed either by the Pakistan state or rigid religious values but rather, 
an active and creative part of the country’s socio-political culture ( Nelson 2009; Ahmad 
2009; Zaman 2002; Verkaaik 2005;  Werbner 2004; Marsden 2005).  
 
Radical  (Mis)representations : 
 
          It can be argued that personal religiosity cannot be truly 'represented' by the 
religious or political leaders. It is therefore important to make a distinction between 
organized religion, its leaders, institutions and philosophy, on the one hand, and the 
people who affiliate themselves with that religion. People, as 'agentative actors, 
determine the inclusive or authoritarian thrust of their own religion.( Mahmood 2009; 
Bayat 2007) From this perspective, religion is nothing but a body of beliefs and ideas 
which invariably makes claims to 'authentic meaning' or some 'higher truth'. 82 However 
the individuals or groups that hold social power and are politically assertive often 
'hegemonize' those truths.83 More often than not small sections of a community, having 
the 'shrillest voice' and the most activist presence become 'representative' of the religion 
undeservedly, but understandably. (Bilgrami 2012; Qadeer 2006) 'Absolutist Muslim 
minorities', with the exploitative appeal that they generate, have a disproportionately 
large public presence and consequently become 'representative' of Islam, as has 
happened in Pakistan. This equation of a religion with 'a small fraction' of its 
membership and its practices, can also have the effect of 'driving ordinary devout 
people into the arms of the fundamentalists'. (Bilgrami 2012; Taylor 2012) This 
somewhat poetic allusion towards increasing religiosity suggests that forced categories 
and identities can have and have already had a destabilizing effect on Muslim identity.  
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          Furthermore Bilgrami points out that Muslim commitment to Islam is governed by 
a 'historically determined defensiveness' where any criticism of the religious radicals 
would be seen as a surrender to the 'forces of the West'.84 Furthermore the rhetoric of 
‘secularization’ has become laden manifestly with 'anti-Islam propaganda' which in turn 
plays a role in making the vast majority of ordinary Muslims 'unwilling to be critical of 
the offending practitioners in their midst' and instead avidly adopting visible markers of 
religiosity. These factors cause a 'defensively uncritical psychology' within the majority, 
who might have otherwise been more willing to criticize fundamentalists in their 
community. (Asad 2003; Bilgrami 2012) Because of this defensive function and their 
'silence' ordinary Muslims are exploited by political agenda of absolutist Muslims.  
            
            But does such silence make them radical themselves, as is generally implied and  
characterized as the phenomenon of 'growing radicalization' in the society, is a question 
that needs to be explored in Pakistan's context. Such collective silence from groups who 
do not publicly resist or disparage radical or contentious viewpoints in a society, social 
scientists point out, does not make people 'collaborators' or 'compromisers' within 
certain worldviews. 85  This is significant because increasing opinion suggests that 
'Pakistan has become obsessed with religiosity' and that 'increasing radicalization is 
ravaging the country'. (Husain 2012; Rashid 2012; Siddiqa 2011)  Such characterization of 
obsession with religion or 'over-religiosity', couched in various terms such as 
fundamentalism, revivalism, conservatism, fanaticism or extremism, appear to represent 
a global trend which specifically targets Islam and are not limited to Pakistan as such. 
Such representations in the West have shaped a particular, negative conception of 
Muslim societies, the yardstick and the central core of which is 'religio-centrism' 
(Mahmood 2009). So much so that  the authoritarian regimes, weak civil societies and 
corrupt political culture in the Muslim world are often attributed to its religion, Islam. 
(Bayat 2007; Nasr 2009). However the outstanding feature of Pakistan, it can be pointed 
out, is not any unified religion that people follow but rather other diverse questions of 
politics, economy and sociology manifestly impinge on the notion of religious identity 
(Lieven 2011; Nasr 2009). 
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          As Mahmood points out , such descriptions of 'religious extremism' enfold a set of 
judgments and evaluations such that 'to abide by a certain description is also to uphold 
these judgments'(Mahmood 2008).  Events and persons deemed 'extremist' or 'radically 
dangerous' are often not only reductive of the conditions they purport to describe, but 
more importantly, they are premised on 'normative conceptions of the subject, law, and 
language' and the assumption that the philosophical truth is on the side of the liberal 
and secular ideal'.86 The dichotomous characterization of secular and religious depends 
upon such explanations of religious extremism, often amassing together 'a series of 
practices and images that are said to threaten the secular liberal worldview'87, ranging 
from suicide bombers, to veiled women, to angry mobs burning books, to preachers 
pushing devious agendas in madrassas, as has been seen in Pakistan. Needless to say, 
these diverse set of images and practices neither emanate from a singular religious logic 
nor belong sociologically to a unified political formation (Mahmood 2008). Such 
assumptions need to be urgently re-thought and revised if one is to look beyond the 
current 'secular-religious' impasse in Pakistan. However questioning normative 
assumptions about the secular discourse can be situated as 'a grave intellectual and 
political error', which is ultimately dismissed as 'conservatism'.88  
 
The Nature of 'Conservatism' and 'Radicalization' in Pakistan: 
 
             The terms 'conservatism' and 'radicalization' are frequently being used to 
describe an increased level of religiosity within the Pakistani society. Conservatism is 
the disposition that seeks to preserve or restore the established traditional order and to 
limit change. Radicalization on the other hand, in the literal sense, is the process by 
which an individual changes from passiveness or pacifist activism to become more 
revolutionary, militant or extremist, and refuses tradition (Kaviraj 2010; Mahmood 
2009). Such characterization of radicalism can be fittingly ascribed to certain Islamist 
groups or militant political organization which exist within Pakistan but it does not 
represent the predominant sensiblity of ordinary Pakistanis who cannot be described as 
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militants, revolutionaries or refusers of tradition. Nor does the notion of 'latent 
radicalism', which is defined as the 'inability to imagine the other' on the basis of 
religious dogmatic differences ( Siddiqa 2011), seem to resonate with the outlook of a 
majority of Pakistanis who uphold inclusive and tolerant values (Marsden 2005).    
 
         More often than not in Pakistan these terms are conflated with each other when 
infact they are grounded in very different realities. Radicalism 'refuses' tradition while 
conservatism seeks to preserve it. In this context Pakistan has been described as 'a highly 
conservative', archaic and 'somnolent mass of diverse and different societies' based on 
strong 'traditional kinship networks' (Lieven 2011; Qadeer 2006). The 'conservative' and 
'traditional' nature of the Pakistani society is the biggest deterrent against 
fundamentalism and radicalism (Lieven 2011). The reason the Islamism fails in Pakistan 
is because of the 'conservative nature of the state' since ordinary people are rooted in 
tradition and don't support Islamists agenda which thrives manifestly on a 'partially 
achieved modernity'(Iqtidar 2011). Paradoxically for instance, people use the ballot for 
tactical reasons informed by local traditions and politics, not rigid, otherworldly 
religious concerns that are symbolized by the Islamists. Recent work on electoral 
decision-making process in central Punjab has shown people make decisions based not 
on religion but on perceptions of the effectiveness of the candidate in 'delivering 
patronage benefits' and  how many local landowners who identify themselves as devout 
Muslims and lent rhetorical support to the institutionalized religion actually show a 
propensity to 'resist' and subvert Islamic inheritance laws 'seeking to avoid its effective 
or consistent enforcement' ( Nelson 2011; Wilder 1999).   
         
            This discrepancy can be explained with the notion that one can understand 
religion and society only from 'particular locations within' them. 89 In this sense people 
in Pakistan locate and define religion within their society and the larger world in 
particular contexts and in multiple ways. It also seems erroneous to assume that people 
within a culture live 'uniform lives' or believe in identical things and that all people who 
                                                 




engage with religion have the same quantitative or qualitative experiences that connect 
them with their belief. (Kaviraj 2010; Mahmood 2006) It is therefore important to be 
attentive to the variety of projects, conceptions of selfhood, structures of authority and 
goals that exist apart from religion among people living in Islamic culture because none 
of these are realistically reducible to a singular framework (Mahmood 2012), as the 
political and institutionalized forms of Islam assert in Pakistan.  
 
        The complexity of positions and locations within 'the Pakistani identity' suggests 
that complicated relationships exist among factors such as religion culture, ethnicity, 
gender, class, age, forces of nationalism and modernity and that identity is determined 
not only by religion but equally by socio-cultural factors as well. In a study of Pakistani 
women, Shahla Haeri notes that the nikah or the Muslim marriage contract, is the 'least 
elaborate' part of the predominant wedding rituals in Pakistan which span over three to 
four days. She points out that the traditional rituals and ceremonies like the mehndi 
which involve singing and dancing take precedence over the Islamic nikah. (Haeri 2002) 
In this sense social and cultural tradition take precedence over religiosity. Similarly even 
as the religious elite have been incessantly publicly castigating 'the obscenity of 
Bollywood movies' and the immorality of cultural festivals like Basant as being 
'unIslamic', both these practices have thrived in Pakistan, even in conservative 
households and remote villages (Qadeer 2006). Such facts affirm that while religiosity 
manifestly permeates daily life, people also uphold tradition and modernity in equal 
measure. 
 
A 'Critical Middle' in the Debate on Tradition and Modernity :   
 
       Pakistan's experience bears out that the relationship between tradition and 
modernity is not unidirectional but is 'adaptive' and traditions have been very 'resilient' 
in their interaction with modern forces, by constantly being 'reinvented' to meet new 
challenges. (Lieven 2011; Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005) Throughout Pakistan's history 
people seemed to have embraced the goal of material well being and have been eager to 
adopt modernity regardless of their beliefs and traditions. In this regard Pakistan has 
incessantly witnessed 'a grafting of modern forms onto traditional functions and 
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meanings', reflecting a dialectical process between traditional society and modern 
practices.90   
  
        The stark distinctions between the 'traditional' and 'modern' have habituated us to 
think of these two as 'exclusive and exhaustive', such that any thing that was not 
modern or liberal was taken to be traditional.91 Such paradoxes underline one of the 
major theoretical problem arising out of 'the restrictive structure' of the received theory 
of modernity (Kaviraj 2005). In such discourse it is therefore not possible to be modern 
and traditional at the same time, a fact that belies the reality on ground in Pakistan 
where people manifestly uphold both tradition and modernity. Furthermore, when the 
modernity is so intrinsically equated with Western forms of politics, economy and social 
behavior, this lead to 'monstrous misidentification of present facts' 92. From the Western 
perspective veiling, urban poverty and political Islam are seen as 'traditional' 
phenomenon when the they have actually shown to be the inverse (Iqtidar 2011; 
Mahmood 2009; Kaviraj 1997). Religious tolerance is seen as a modern concept which is 
a consequence of secularization of the society. However scholarship has shown that 
tolerance and the acceptance of religious diversity were an intrinsic element of the 
traditional pre-modern South Asian society. (Kaviraj 2010; Marsden 2010; Hallaq 2009) 
In this sense such dichotomies need to be questioned as a distortion of the actual reality. 
 
          Nasr describes the 'devoutly Islamic yet highly modern Muslims of Pakistan' as the 
'critical middle' of the Pakistani society, which increasingly looks to religion and 
tradition 'to help navigate the currents of change' and can be seen as 'the true force for 
moderation' in Pakistan.93 As Nasr points out 'there is much Islam at the heart of the 
Pakistani society, but that society is much more interested in development and 
prosperity than jihad or foreign adventures'. 94  Nasr acknowledges that violent 
extremism has footholds in Pakistan, but insists that extremism does not appeal to 
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majority of the population which is comprised of 'commerce-minded' Muslims who 
want to do 'vigorous business even while staying true to their Islamic faith'.95 People in 
Pakistan are 'purely motivated by material gains' to seek social development at the local 
level.96 In other words they are driven by more immediate concerns than religion. It this 
context it is not the didactic principles of institutionalized Islam but rather the economic 
dealing, acquisitive interests and material considerations, which drive everyday life in 
Pakistan (Lieven 2011; Nasr 2009; Qadeer 2006; Hasan 2002). What most Pakistanis seem 
to be seeking is an 'enchanted modern', that is modernity which includes a spiritual and 
religious component but is also a blend of technological advance and consumerism, and 
individualism. ( Deeb 2006) 
           This is not to take away from the fact that in Pakistan there has been a vivid 
reappearance of 'religion' in the public sphere in different forms of religious 
commitments and social identity, which manifests itself in issues of sartorial and 
linguistic choices, academic preferences, discussion on offensive speech and imagery etc. 
This 'religion' which has become very visible in the public sphere in Pakistan is the 
'institutionalized religion' which leads to an 'objectification' of faith, aspires to give faith 
'a concrete form' and create pious subjects infused and informed with 'a unitary 
consciousness' (Iqtidar 2011; Mahmood 2006; Ewing 1997). Such discourse makes Islam 
'accessible' in the public sphere in a way that makes people more amenable to engaging 
with religious discourse ( Iqtidar 2011; Ahmad 2009). Significantly Islam is presented as 
not being 'illiterate and backward' but as something 'very modern and rational'97 and the 
rationality behind Islamic precepts is incessantly underlined to create a dialectical 
relationship between faith and reason. People involved in such particular religious 
framework inevitably become actively involved in the construction of 'a particular kind 
of a Pakistani culture' and in many ways 'appropriate the meaning of Islam'. ( Iqtidar 
2011; Ahmad 2010; Zia 2009) It allows for 'a narrow path of acceptable behavior' which is 
highlighted by a refusal to participate in 'traditional Islamic rituals' and foregoing a 
number of cultural practices taking place around major life events such as weddings and 
deaths etc. (Iqtidar 2011; Husain 2011; Ahmad 2009) The conspicuous changes 
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introduced by such religiosity in sartorial choices, conversations and behavior stand out 
in the public sphere and become more 'visible' than quotidian everyday practices. It is 
specifically those affiliated with such institutionalized religious frameworks, who are 
the main components of the 'Islamic civil society', that competes assiduously with the 
'lifestyle liberals' for social primacy in the public sphere.  
 
        However such 'institutionalization', 'objectification' and 'rationalization' of belief is 
inevitably problematic from the perspective of an ordinary Pakistani because it seeks to 
dismiss and separate the religious from the spiritual, and the popular form of Islam that 
is practiced in Pakistan manifestly has a 'spiritual' proclivity (Lieven 2011; Marsden 
2010; Qadeer 2006). Furthermore competing social and cultural codes constrain 
institutionalized faith and produce or accentuated tensions and dissonance among  
individuals associated with such religious frameworks (Iqtidar 2011; Ahmad2009; 
Zaman 2002). These competing forces range from cultural practices, levels of education 
or linguistic divides such as the unofficial 'Urdu medium versus English medium' 
segregation 98, and become a source of tension for people within the institutionalized 
religious frameworks and between those who practice popular forms of religion. This 
can be affirmed from the experience of the Al-Huda organization whose 'success' has 
been unwittingly 'tempered' by people who are religious but yet are grounded in 
competing cultural codes that 'prevent them from completely assimilating it's 
ideology'.99 In this way orthodox ideology clashes with other preexisting socio-cultural 
codes since different people are religious in a different number of ways.  
        
Irrelevance of Political and Institutionalized Islam in Pakistan: 
            
         In a sense the 'puritan idealism' that nourishes the Islamists makes it irrelevant to 
the general public in Pakistan at the same time. The 'totalizing' narrative of the Islamist 
project runs counter to the people's commitment to regional traditional culture and 
ethnic identity. (Lieven 2011; Marsden 2005)  Given the predominance of tradition in 
Pakistan the revivalist Islamic ideology has thrived in a 'vacuum of idealism' because the 
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Islamist projects do not want to maintain traditional status quo but to change it.100 
Furthermore opinion polls have consistently shown that a majority of Pakistanis reject 
militant and radical viewpoints held by the Islamist groups.101 This fact is reflected in the 
electoral process where the religious parties consistently do poorly, getting only 5% of 
the popular votes at best. (Lieven 2011; Ali 2008) They have no popular support but are 
capable of sustaining themselves in mainstream politics by maintaining a parasitical 
relationship with the military and the Saudi financing community. Strong patronage 
links with the Pakistan military and Saudi Arabia among other the Gulf states clearly 
has a direct impact on the way a certain kind of Islam became predominantly visible in 
the society (Lieven 2011 ; Qadeer 2006; Ghazali 1994). 
 
           Therefore distinct political factors play a role in the resurgence of a politicized 
religious activism mainly due to the opportunism of successive political leadership that 
has pandered to it. As Asad has observed, orthodoxy is 'not a mere body of opinion but 
a distinctive relationship of power . . . to regulate, uphold, re-quire or adjust what are 
perceived to be correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace 
incorrect ones'.102  Seen from this perspective, the spread of a heightened orthodoxy in 
Pakistan is brought about through a great 'reconfiguration' or 're-centering' of Islamic 
tradition which has to do with the orthodoxy's establishment of stricter controls as its 
'recognition as a religious authority' within the state and consequently by defining the 
contours of Islam for the state. The increased public space enjoyed by the radical 
religious groups and parties manifests itself in the social landscape of the country in 
terms of its disruptive nuisance value which encourages orthodoxy and discourages 
public discussion of Islam. (Rashid 2012; Lieven 2011; Qadeer 2006 ; Alavi 2002) These 
religiously mobilized groups put intense and vocal pressure on politics in Pakistan and 
ultimately their agenda is reflective more of it's political aspirations than religious ones, 
which is significant given that religion is the haloed rationale for their existence.  
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        However, all Islamists groups cannot be essentialized as a single faction since even 
within the category of 'religious groups' there is a distinct difference between the  radical 
militants and the traditional ulema. In his work with the religious organizations in 
Pakistan, Zaman cautions us against labeling Pakistan’s religious authorities as 
‘unthinking’ jihadis and shows them to be resourcefully adapting religion to modern 
demands. He makes the distinction between the ‘high ranking’ ulema and the 
‘peripheral’ ulema, between those ‘who have devoted themselves primarily to academic 
pursuits’ and others who ‘wage sectarian battles on the street’. Militant sectarian 
religious groups and parties, are characterized as being led by half-educated 'peripheral' 
mullahs who are not grounded in religious traditions and are also rejected by the 'high 
ranking' ulema. (Zaman 2002) He also alerts us to the need to challenge the notion that 
expanding levels of mass education has inevitably resulted in the weakening of the 
ulema’s authority as well as intellectual influence and convincingly shows that in the face 
of growing levels of education and regimes hostile to their position in society, the ulema 
have sought to define ‘religion’ as a separate sphere and themselves as ‘religious 
specialists’, indicating an almost secular position. The ulema are themselves in 
engagement both with the world of politics and theology that entails the active and 
creative deployment of the intellect. In this way the transmission and synthesis of 
religious ideas and values continues to take place even in the context of hardened 
sectarian boundaries in Pakistan. Recent scholarship also show that Pakistan’s ulema 
have used, incorporated and in the process transformed the doctrines, symbols, and 
practices of Sufi-influenced Islamic texts and teachings in their revivalist discourses. 
(Werbner 2004; Marsden 2005) In this sense all religious institutions cannot be seen as 
being radicalized 'hotbeds of militant extremism' (Husain 2012).  
 
      Islamic groups outside of the mainstream politics are also faced with the same 
dilemmas within their engagement with the society. Sadaf Ahmad's extensive work with 
women's groups like Al-Huda shows that the women who identify themselves with the 
particular religious framework and actively engage in cultural production of such 
religious knowledge 'end up becoming the Other in mainstream urban society' in 
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Pakistan.103  This is so because the outlooks and practices that are upheld by such 
viewpoints are 'novel' and 'foreign' in Pakistan, and go against the dominant cultural 
norms of the society. Ahmad points out that because these practices are not reflective of 
the dominant cultural norms and do not resonate with the society, these women are 
impelled to employ strategies of resistance to overcome 'social resistance' and 
'mainstream disapproval'.104 Zaman and Marsden's work also highlights the way that 
the Tablighi Jamaat's influence has met with resistance in both urban and rural settings 
and  becomes somewhat neutralized by local traditions. ( Marsden 2006; Zaman 2002) 
This indicates that popular religion has been resistant in the face of such forms of Islam. 
 
       It is also relevant to point out that religious institutions are clearly not the most 
popular avenues for education in Pakistan and only 6% of the population go to 
madrassas.105 Recent research has shown that, contrary to the prevalent assumptions in 
the  international discourse on Pakistan, Pakistani people are not clamoring to send their 
children to the Islamists' organizations but rather show an inclination towards 
pragmatic choices by prefering  private schooling which imparts 'modern' education. 
For instance in 1983, there were roughly the same number of madrasas and private 
schools in the country - 2,563 madrasas and 2,770 private schools. By 2005, there were 
five times as many private schools. Moreover, the growth in private schools has 
increased since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while madrasa growth has stayed relatively 
flat.106 
 
         This information is significant because it undercuts the prevalent 'radicalization of 
the society' narrative. In this context it is important to look past fundamentalism's hard 
hitting rhetoric.107 Images of Pakistan as a country turning into a hybrid-theocratic state 
'awash with fundamentalism', a society 'passively embracing Talibanisation' under the 
excessive influence and authority of Islamist parties ( Siddiqa 2011; Husain 2012; Rashid 
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2012) present inadequate accounts of religion, society and politics in Pakistan. Such 
accounts of extremism and violence often over exaggerate the power of Pakistan’s 
‘Islamist’ parties and divert attention from longer–term changes occurring in the society 
such as those that indicate that the fundamentalists power is on the wane (Lieven 2011; 
Nasr 2009; Marsden 2005).  
 
        Invocations of increasing extremism and violence divert attention from the fact that 
public religiosity is frequently not simply an expression of religious affiliation but is 
more often than not, a political statement. Faith as a marker of identity in addition to 
personal belief complicates the relationship between religion and political identity in 
Pakistan. Taking the example of veiling which can be understood as a divine command 
or a symbolic marker, both these understandings of the veil can be analyzed as two 
distinct 'speech acts' that perform 'very different kinds of work in the making of the 
religious subject' and presume a very different relationship between the subject’s 
exteriority and interiority.108 In the usual approach to the subject, the veil is discussed 
within the dichotomy of 'Islamist' versus 'secularist' approach, where one group reveres 
the veil and the other finds it abhorrent.  In a sense women become the objects of 
contestation between these two viewpoints in the public sphere with excessive energy 
expended by men and women in Pakistan to remove the veil, proverbially, and by 
others to affirm or maintain it.  
   
       For the both the Islamists and the 'liberals' the veil is used as the criterion by which 
the level of a Pakistani woman’s piety or commitment to Islam is measured, judged and 
ranked in religiosity. In other words it is an evaluation of the quantity of her religion. 
For the lifestyle liberals it is also a sign of social regression and oppression. But why one 
may ask, is there no middle ground in this discussion and why cannot a woman be 
unveiled and still be 'religious'? Inversely why can a women wearing a veil not be 
'liberated' or 'modern' at the same time?  The answers to these questions seem 
constrained by the need to confine individual preferences within pre-defined categories 
of 'secular' and 'religious'. In this way the veil also becomes an instrument of 
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contestation by the 'lifestyle liberals' and the 'Islamic civil society' over the Muslim 
identity in the Pakistani public sphere.  
          
           It can be argued however that veils are not necessarily religious markers but 
sometimes more an instrument of socio-cultural projection. Although little formal 
statistics exist about the incidence of veiling among Pakistani women, but from the 
existing available information it seems evident that a large number of women who are 
choosing to veil live in urban communities and are educated, independent women. 
(Siddiqa 2011; Ahmad 2010 ; Iqtidar 2011; Haeri 2002). This dispels the myths that the 
only poor, rural and oppressed women are 'forced into veiling' and are a victim of 
increasing 'conservatism' in Pakistan.109  Infact far from indicating that the wearers of the 
veil remain fixed in the world of tradition and the past, the veil has been described as 
'the uniform of arrival' of Muslim women, thereby 'signaling an entrance to and a 
determination to move forward into modernity'.110  Infact, the emergence of women 
capable of forging a path of political, educational, professional, and economic autonomy 
for themselves, as veiled women are doing in the Pakistan, in itself seems to perhaps 
represent 'a moment of unprecedented potential'.111 As recent research has shown that 
veiled women who  'engage with Islam' are openly questioning the orthodox ideology of 
political Islam and 'opening up new spaces for questions and contestations'. (Iqtidar 
2011; Ahmad 2010; 2009) Unfortunately the increasing number of Muslim women 
wearing the veil does act as a visual aid to bolster claims of the 'alarming rise' in Islamic 
fundamentalism. Without particularly intending to perhaps, the veiled women lend 
support and strength to Islamist political forces which, if successful in realizing their 
objectives, would encourage policies that would certainly have a devastatingly negative 
impact on women themselves.  
 
Socio-political Discontent and Social Conservatism: 
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        The manifestation of the growing social conservatism and the increased visible 
markers of religiosity in the Pakistani society can be attributed to the general feeling of 
insecurity and outrage in the post 9/11 world amongst Muslims and the sense that Islam 
and Muslims alike had come under 'a global onslaught'. This has increased the appeal 
for languages of religiosity and nativism to be adopted.112 Such US led violence has led 
to an anti-American sentiment and radicalized an entire generation of jihadis. (Husain 
2012; Rashid 2012) Many in Pakistan see such radicalism and militancy as symbols of the 
manifestation of a geopolitical modernity as a response to foreign presence in 
Afghanistan (Ali 2008; Lieven 2011) In a way Pakistan's turbulent history, a result of 
continuous military rule and unpopular global alliances, also confronts the ruling elite in 
the form of increased symbols of religiosity in the public sphere( Lieven 2011;Nasr 2009). 
The overwhelming majority of the country disapproves of the government's foreign 
policy and the consequent 'war on terror' has caused 'great unhappiness' on Pakistan's 
streets as well as in the military ranks. 113  Domestic factors such as these and 
globalization also serve to undermine citizen's trust in government and in political 
leadership, perhaps pushing some citizens to search for public authority in 'ready made' 
or 'reinvented' religious symbols or channels. 114  Such domestic and geopolitical 
explanations can account for the various aspects of emerging religiosity in the public 
sphere as Pakistanis set to the task of ‘being Muslim’ in their world of political 
uncertainty and transformation.  
 
      After 9/11 however Pakistan’s local problems have taken on a global significance 
and the relationship between religion and politics in Pakistan acquired an urgency. It is 
in this context that the 'resurgence of religion' in Pakistan's public sphere has come to be 
seen as a 'problem'. This revival of religion in the public sphere has thus far largely been 
conceptualized by both scholars and popular commentators as the product of growing 
Islamic fundamentalism or radicalization of the population. However as recent 
scholarship suggests, this form of analysis 'conceals far more than it reveals about the 
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form of the country’s political culture today' about the complexity of the relationship 
between Islam and politics in Pakistan since the nature of religiosity in Pakistan can be 
easily distinguished from politicized radicalism.115 
 
Popular Religion in Pakistan : 
 
        A majority of Pakistani people do not subscribe to the puritanical and textual 'High 
Islam' that is propagated by the religious elite and uphold 'Low Islam' which is tolerant 
and inclusive (Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005). Popular 'low Islam' has syncretic and 
spiritual outlooks, which are tolerant of religious diversity, is manifestly practiced in 
both rural and urban settings in Pakistan (Lieven 2011).  In this sense the predominant 
form of religion that is practiced is a 'thick religion 'which is socially tolerant and 
attentive to ritualistic observances, and is based around 'small communal identities'. 116  
In Pakistan ‘being Muslim’ is never an exclusive identity, but only one of many 
situational identities of family, language, nation, region, gender and others which 
require pragmatic compromise and accommodation. Therefore debates over ‘being 
Muslim’ therefore are intensely local in Pakistan and popular religious practices in 
Pakistan are localized and contextualized according to the regional, ethnic and 
communal variants of Islam (Lieven 2011; Marsden 2006). Therefore any discussion on 
the nature of religiosity in Pakistan must therefore take into consideration the role 
played by combined intellectual and cultural processes in religious experience.  
 
       Various recent surveys of the socio-religious proclivities in Pakistan show how 
people 'think, react and question' when they are called upon to change or conform  to 
new standards of spirituality and behavior by the state, the ruling elite or by growing 
influence of Islamizing forces.117 It is too often assumed by both popular commentators 
and scholars that there are few possibilities for 'the living of creative lives within 
Islam',118  but such creativity seems manifest in Pakistan. Muslims in Pakistan have 
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resourcefully deployed, engaged, and challenged historically important Islamic concepts, 
teachings and figures of authority in ways that offer them the possibility of confronting 
the contemporary problems they face in their everyday lives (Lieven 2011; Marsden 
2006).  
 
         A great diversity and 'tolerant flexibility' exists in the forms of Muslim religiosity 
and identity available to believers in contemporary Pakistan. For instance whilst 
politically manipulated acts of violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims are now a 
regular feature of Pakistan’s social landscape, Sunnis and Shi’as continue to live 
peacefully together in many communities and regions of the country. Marsden 
highlights the 'thoughtful life of plurality'119 that the Shi'a-Sunni lead in Chitral, with 
both sects bound together through 'shared sources of faith and values'120. A survey of 
neighbourhood mosques in Lahore shows how Barelvi Sunni imams regularly speak at 
gatherings in Shia imambargahs and hold commemorations in their own mosques during 
Muharram (Khan 2011). In other instances Sunni and Shias are shown to allow each 
other's presence of at their respective mosques and even allowing Ahmadis, who are 
prohibited to construct their own masjids, in their mosques and protecting them by 
'guaranteeing them secrecy in the midst of public exposure'121.  In Islamabad many 
women's dars groups are regularly attended by women of both Shi'a and Sunni sects to 
encourage cooperation and understanding between the two (Ahmad 2009).  In this sense 
it is not possible to argue that the violent nature of Sunni–Shi’a relations is a ‘routinized’ 
and an inevitable feature of life in the country. If certain sections of the 'Islamic civil 
society' have sought to radicalize Sunni and Shi’a identities across Pakistan, they have 
not been overly successful in their efforts (Lieven 2011; Marsden 2005; Qadeer2006) Not 
too many Muslims in Pakistan see the religious elite as 'authentic founts of pure Islam' 
and ‘ordinary Muslims’ continuously attempt to contest the calls to commitment 
towards institutionalized orthodox Islam.  122  
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          An integral part of popular religion in Pakistan are the Sufi thought and practice 
that can be seen as a powerful source of faith and values as a thriving and dynamic 
feature of Pakistan society which transcends cultural and linguistic divides. In this way 
Muslims in Pakistan seem 'bound together by a culture of pilgrimages and allegiances to 
shrines and holy saints' which cut across sectarian, provincial and linguistic 
boundaries. 123  The contention that Sufism is 'derived from the past' and 'a rural 
phenomenon' has also been thoroughly discredited by recent research (Lieven 2011; 
Marsden 2006; Werbner 2004). There are sufficient examples of predominance of an 
urban presence of syncretism that is defining feature of Sufism.  Furthermore Sufism is 
not bound by the Sunni-Shi'a divide and is seen as 'something undefined in-between'.124 
The Sufi shrines are therefore equally frequented by Shi'as and Sunnis.( Lieven 2011; 
Marsden 2010)  
 
         What has been described as an overwhelmingly 'Pakistan-centered' religious 
orientation is seen as the main force behind the 'homogenization of the thinking and 
practices of Pakistan’s Muslims'. 125  For instance, in Kohat, where hard-line 
fundamentalism is manifestly present, a Sufi brotherhood not only has followers from 
different regions of Pakistan, but also frequently brings different sects together in 
moments of shared religious ritual,  despite the differences of the settings from which 
the followers of the saint hail (Werbner 2004). Lieven defines Sufism as 'a middle space' 
in Pakistan and points out that this Sufi culture is not just a rural phenomenon. The way 
in which the shrines of Pir Golra Sharif and Bari Imam near Islamabad are frequented by 
the urban elites affirm the fact that Sufism is very much an urban phenomenon in the 
present times(Lieven 2011). Sufism has also been resistant and resilient enough not to be 
eclipsed or unsettled by Western forms of modernity or the modernism of the Islamists 
and the transcommunal nature of the shrines, is 'a very strong cultural and emotional 
force' based on 'latitudinarian and pacifist moderation' which presents a strong sense of 
living and growing tradition.126 
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         Similarly Marsden's work highlights the Sufi outlooks of musical performers who 
'play and pray in the same space' and the Sufi proclivities of the 'amulet making' 
Deobandi alims who are also members of the Tablighi Jamaat.127  He also points out that 
the Sufi tradition in Chitral, 'focuses on intellectual and emotional engagement with Sufi 
texts and ideas, rather than ecstatic worship at shrines and affiliation to formalised Sufi 
lodges and brotherhood'.128 His work depicts the flourishing of Sufi poetry and musical 
tradition in the North western region of Chitral in the face of Islamist objections, as an 
affirmation of the fact that the society there is largely 'resistant' to radical 
fundamentalism.129 In the same way Khan highlights the way in which many mosque 
communities in Lahore continue to celebrate Eid-Milad Nabi and encourage practices of 
naat and durood continue despite being banned or condemned frowned upon by the 
Deobandi or Ahle Hadith groups for 'being in excess'.130 
   
      Furthermore the manifestations of religion in the popular culture in Pakistan also 
highlight a 'wholesome' Pakistani identity that manifestly seems to 'celebrate' diversity, 
by taking cues from different strains of Islam practiced within Pakistan (Elias 2011; 
Saima Zaidi 2010; Dalmia and Hashmi 2007). The popular visual culture in Pakistan is 
based on indigenous popular icons, a majority of which draw heavily on religion and 
mythology. In this way these religious symbols in the popular culture exist as 
'perceptual metaphors', showing the capacity to pattern responses in the context of how 
the individual relates to the world or to the divine  (Dalmia and Hashmi 2007). Pakistani 
popular culture reveals 'a very pluralistic and inclusive society' where a heterogeneity of 
Islamic beliefs and practices in the social landscape coexist easily, even with non-Islamic 
ones and it is not unusual to find Hindu or Christian symbolism immersed with the 
Muslim traditional symbols (Saima Zaidi 2010; Dalmia and Hashmi 2007). The diversity 
of such thought and expression reflected in popular culture allows for the 'coexistence of 
contradictions' that exist in the form of dichotomies of the spiritual and material, 
traditionalism and modernity, realism and fantasy realms in the society. (Saima Zaidi 
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2010)  Religious imagery in the popular culture also co-exists comfortably with modern 
symbols so that images of Buraq 131 and  F-16s can be easily placed within the same 
frames, representing worldviews that uphold tradition and modernity in equal measure 
(Elias 2011).  
 
        An explosive expression of popular or folk art manifests itself in the Pakistani truck 
art, for instance, which also serves as a platform of potent religious symbolism. Such art 
incorporates religious symbols and texts, good luck charms, as well as lines of verse, 
which are humorous, romantic, and philosophical ( Elias 2011, Saima Zaidi 2010). Such 
religious images, even at their least denotative or most abstract, are symbols which 
'provoke thought and demand a response' from the viewers (Elias 2011). The truck art 
thus creates 'a sacred geography' spanning Pakistan and becomes a reflection of 'an 
imagined community' that is united by symbolism.132 That these religious symbols are 
pictorial, the most common religious symbols being the Ka’baa and the Prophet’s 
Mosque, and that pictorial representation elicited 'religious reactions' from onlookers, 
also raises questions about the real and imagined nature of religion and religious art in 
Pakistan, which views itself 'as resolutely lacking pictorial representations'. 133  Such 
representations of popular religion have until recently been conspicuously absent in the 
elite discussions on culture and religion, which manifestly dominate the public sphere.  
In this sense the 'imagined' and the 'lived' culture are at a variance with each other, 
where the imagined culture is framed in a unitary form of Islam and the lived culture 
continues to be informed by popular forms of religion. This 'thematic distance' between 
the imagined and lived religion leads to the 'compartmentalization' of social life.134  
  
Competing identities , Multiple locations:    
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       Such 'compartmentalization' of religious and social life is manifestly visible in the 
'normative paradoxes'135 that exist in the Pakistani society. Taking into account, for 
instance, the 'regimes of illegality' that surround the construction of mosques in Lahore 
where the religious elite openly support the illegal seizure and construction of mosques 
through dubious financial means. (Khan 2010) Khan points out the possibility that 
almost 90% of all mosques in Lahore are built on illegally seized land and yet are 
frequented by 'pious' 136 people who are able to rationalize such discrepancies within 
their religious worldviews. Similarly Pakistan's 'chaotic road traffic' is an excellent 
illustration of a contrast between professed piety and personal irresponsibility that is 
evident everywhere in Pakistan. Vehicles are adorned with religious memorabilia and 
roadsides frequently showcase Quranic texts but traffic rules are habitually flouted and 
little regard is given to the safety of others, and in this sense the moral principles of 
Islam clearly do not inform the traffic behavior in Pakistan (Elias 2011; Qadeer 2006).   
 
      Another example of the 'compartmentalization' of social life can be seen by the way 
issues in ordinary people's lives, informed by a number of ideological frameworks, are 
prioritized to fit specific contexts. Ahmad cites the examples of 'pious' young girls in 
Islamabad, who believe that listening to music is forbidden, do not listen to it during 
Ramadan because it is a time when their 'Muslim identity may be at its strongest'.137 This 
does not take away from the fact that, living in a culture in which music is a normal  part 
of life, these girls do listen to it otherwise.  In this sense such persons may experience 
themselves as a 'symbolic, timeless whole but this self may quickly be displaced by 
another, quite different self which is based in a different definition of the situation'.138 In 
this way the projection of a person's identity is contextual or dependant on specific 
contexts.    
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       As becomes evident in Pakistan, people do not live their lives within one framework 
but many and have multiply constructed identities because they live in a culture that is 
informed by more than one ideology and set of values. According to Stuart Hall 
individual identities are built over 'varying, often conflicting, positions and discourses 
and are therefore multiply constructed' (Hall 1996). In this sense individual identity in 
Pakistan 'embodies various selves' and upholds distinct 'ideological strands' that allow it 
to identify and connect with others around some issues and under different contexts, 
and in other instances it is does not. The fact that individual life is informed by a number 
of competing identities allows us to question the assumptions of it as a 'unified, coherent 
and self-centered' entity. (Hall 1996) Such assumptions correspond to the western 
conception of the person as being 'bound and organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against its social and natural 
background.'139 Situating an identity within a space of boundaries and categories is 
therefore 'an awkward process' because these boundaries are 'imagined and experienced 
as highly complex, multiple, overlapping, diverging  identities which are also shifting, 
permeable and highly resistant to mapping in conventional ways'.140 
 
       Seeking to restrict the diverse social and religious sensibilities to a rigid dichotomy 
is then tantamount to committing a form of violence on such identities.(Rose 2002; 
Ewing 1990) A one dimensional view of lives and cultures as being seen as 'determined 
by a discourse .....or being totally outside of that discourse' is over simplistic because it is 
'inadequate to capture subjective experience in the face of the clash of discourses and the 
competition of ideologies characteristic of postcolonial societies' like Pakistan .'141 In this 
sense there is a need to question rigid Eurocentric categories and binary distinctions 
such as modern vs. traditional, religious vs. secular for analytical purposes since most 
Pakistanis seem to want to transcend these categories. Ultimately the elite notions of 
secularism and absolutist religious piety do not seem to matter much to the most 
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Pakistanis or determine how people make decisions about private or public matters 
since most Pakistani people do not consciously see themselves as either rejecting religion 
or embracing a secular modernity. (Lieven 2011; Nasr 2009; Qadeer 2006; Marsden 2005).  
 
         Pakistanis continue to show an inclination towards considerable religiosity while 
upholding progressive ideals. In this they reflect the distinctive 'devout Muslim's 
identity', where their commitment to Islam has 'a deep integrated place in their self 
identity' but also upholds 'a fundamental commitment to modernity'.142  In her study of 
Bangladeshi women Elora Shehabuddin describes this sensibility as a 'subaltern 
rationality' through which decisions are made on the basis of material and spiritual 
concerns which seem irrational from both secular and Islamists perspectives.143 In the 
same way with the apparent rejection of tradition and modernity, religious and secular 
binaries, Muslims in Pakistan provoke changes in their surroundings by adopting 
secular strategies without abandoning Islam but rather by retaining, reclaiming and 
reshaping it. (Qadeer 2006, Marsden 2005, Lieven 2011) In many instances the actions 
and beliefs of citizens often appear inconsistent and contradictory, but they become 
comprehensible when one realizes that they are infact motivated not by ignorance and 
gullibility, as the 'life-style liberals' and the Islamist elites alike claim, but by a 
rationalized knowledge, born of experience of the limits of the state and contemporary 
existential dilemmas.  
          
         However the intensifying social problems also bear evidence of 'a moral crises' in 
Pakistan, which has also been described as the dilemma of Pakistan's social change 
whose resolution could possibly lie in 'a liberal and pluralist social order' in which 
popular Islam continues to be 'the source of ethical and spiritual guidance'.144 There are 
various examples in recent scholarship that points towards the acceptance of such a 
social order. Oskaar Verkaaik's research in Hyderabad with the urban unemployed and 
underemployed youth shows them as neither resisting or unthinkingly following the 
country’s powerful religious or more ‘secular’ parties, but rather as having constructed a 
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symbolic and meaningful place for themselves in what is often stereotyped as being 
Pakistan’s 'elite-governed political system'. He also shows how the MQM promoted a 
Muslim identity that was ‘a paradoxical reconciliation of complimentary but 
contradictory discourses on Muslim nationalism and ethnic solidarity, Islamic 
modernism and Sufism’, and that this reconciliation of complex and seemingly 
incompatible sets of discourses was made possible by 'creative fun'. (Verkaaik 2004) 
Werbner's work show how people from diverse walks of life and ideological spectrums, 
including the educated elite and secular army officers who are deemed to be impervious 
to 'low' syncretic culture, are avid followers of the Sufi culture in Kohat. (Werbner 2004) 
In Chitral, the comparatively well-educated village Muslims did not automatically turn 
towards Islamist and piety-inclined movements but instead they formulated their own 
rationalized decisions which were critical of both the teachings and the practices of 
Muslims they themselves referred to as ‘extremists', as well as the Western influences 
(Marsden 2005). 
 
          It is significant also to note that half of Pakistan population, which is under 
twenty–five years of age and has increased access to higher levels of education and 
varieties of networking and information–sharing than the previous generations, is 
significantly influencing the public sphere. As Nasr and Lieven note this generation 
have a significantly modern outlook but who are also 'religiously inclined'. That they 
can 'read the Qur’an on their own' and 'talk back to clerics' is perhaps the sign of the 
way in which they can a role in effecting social change by questioning political Islam 
and allowing popular religion to express itself in the public sphere.( Lieven 2011; Nasr 
2009)  
 
Hidden Debates, Ordinary Voices - A 'Revitalized' Public Sphere  :  
 
         Recent trends are indicative of the opening of new social spaces in the public 
sphere which is fast becoming an arena of political expression for groups that have been 
sidelined in the past. There is a 'new sense of the public' in Pakistan presently owing to 
 54 
significant factors like the 'media revolution', 145  which has brought into the public 
sphere already existing forms of invisible debates which lacked articulation in the 
society. This is significant that the ordinary voices in Pakistan have not been able to 
articulate themselves meaningfully in the public sphere until present times as the 
institutionalized, radical Islam has dominated the public space, while the popular forms 
of religiosity have functioned largely in the private. Religious debates in the public 
sphere have been manipulated and appropriated through censorship of popular 
religious practice and speech so much so that the elite and the mullahs 'seem to have 
done qabza on public speech'.146  In this sense popular religious values and practices in 
Pakistan's social history have remained 'hidden in the margins and interstices' since 
people could 'speak' meaningfully only in the non-public spaces. (Asdar Ali 2004)  
          
         Such hidden debates are not particular to Pakistan however. In classical 
Habermassian terms, popular culture or religion do not fully qualify as 'universal 
domains', because they were based on the assumption that 'ordinary people' not only 
'lack the vocabulary to articulate themselves as an audience', but they also 'hardly 
participate in public life', a fact which foregrounds them 'as (emotional) witnesses rather 
than as experts or persons holding a view or an (interesting) opinion' (Butler and 
Habermas 2011). Consequently any debate resulting from within the popular culture 
tends to be 'among acquaintances, neighbors or co-workers' and is in point of fact 
'hidden' (Butler and Habermas 2011; Hall 1996). However such notions of the public 
sphere, which relegates popular religion to the private and removes it from the domain 
of rational discussion, have been effectively challenged in recent times.  
          
         Recent scholarship has shown that 'unique forms of democratic debate, thought 
and experience' are an integral feature of Pakistan’s social culture, inspite of the 
dominance of the Islamists, the military and elite classes in the political and public 
sphere. (Lieven 2011; Nasr 2009; Marsden 2005) These debates which were largely taking 
place in the private realm are increasingly being articulated in the public sphere. In this 
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sense, the role played by critical political debate, be it in the pulpits of the country’s 
mosques, or in vernacular language, university journals, 'cannot be underestimated' in 
order to capture the nature of critical political engagement in Pakistan.147  This also 
indicates that the inequitable political culture and the forms of power relations upon 
which they build have not gone 'uncontested' in the country, but rather urban private 
spaces have already been locations of quiet struggles. Bayat describes this as the 'art of 
presence' where through their quiet and unassuming daily struggles, people  
'reconfigure new realities on the ground' not through formal institutional channels, from 
which they are largely excluded, but through 'critical debates and actions in the very 
zones of exclusion'.148 In Pakistan's case such debate has meant the unsettling of the 
status quo of the political elite and the questioning of the rigid orthodox religion. 
Furthermore this process is being facilitated by the fact that much of these debates are 
increasingly taking place in Urdu language, which has 'a multicultural and multi-
religious vocabulary'149, that gives it the potential to bring disparate voices together . 
 
            Inspite of the fact that most people in Pakistan can effectively articulate 
themselves in Urdu, Urdu has inadvertently come to be seen as a sign of 'backwardness' 
and 'associated with political Islam' in complex multi-dimensional ways. (Rahman 2006)  
Well-known liberal intellectuals  have publicly derided the language and gone as far to 
say that 'Urdu is intrinsically not a progressive language, whereas English is'. 150  
Historically Urdu was seen as 'the linchpin of the two-nation theory' and 'a cornerstone 
of Pakistani nationalism' so much so that unconditional allegiance to the Urdu language 
almost became 'an article of faith' and 'an intrinsic part of the Pakistani Muslim, as 
opposed to a secular and Westernized, identity'.151 Possibly because of the religious 
right's support of Urdu since the very time of the inception of Pakistan, the 'English 
speaking elite' have been 'resistant' to and 'opposed Urdu', considering it to be 'the 
language of their opposition', namely the radical Islamists.152  
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        In complex and contradictory ways therefore, Urdu plays a very contested political 
role in Pakistan where in linguistic terms the society is divided along ideological and 
class lines, so that Urdu is also part of the vertical (socio-economic class) conflict in the 
country where 'the 'elites with wealth and power have access to  English medium 
schooling and the masses are educated either in Urdu or not at all'.153 Urdu-medium 
schools and colleges are said to cater mostly to the lower-middle and middle classes and 
facilitate right wing political and cultural views, while English caters mostly to the 
upper-middle and upper classes with liberal political and cultural views. While the 
English mediums schooling is considered to impart 'liberal views' such as encouraging 
tolerance for religious minorities and sensitivity towards women's issues, it also 
manifestly  'alienates students from their culture and makes them look down upon their 
compatriots who are not as Westernized as themselves.'154  The English language is also 
seen as 'a status symbol' and 'a class-identity marker' and consequently Urdu has come 
to be seen as subordinate to the interests of the English speaking urban elite. Urdu 
becomes 'a liability' which hinders one from 'rising in the society'. (Hasan 2002; Rahman 
2005). The attribution of 'a lower status' to Urdu and even local languages, 'militates 
against linguistic and cultural diversity, weakens the "have-nots" even further and 
encourages poverty by concentrating the economic power in the hands of the English-
speaking elite'155. Interestingly however this linguistic disparity also informs debates and 
creates disparity even within the religious circles. Even within religious organizations 
like Al-Huda, the English medium and Urdu medium divisions, lead to important 
divergences over specific tactics and strategies and are a source of constant tension 
between the two groups who inspite of sharing the same religious ideology have 
'significantly different outlooks on life'.156  
           
           Given the nature of the  discussion taking place presently within the 'Islamic civil 
society', for whom Urdu is manifestly the medium of articulation, the general public 
discourse in Urdu overtly disparages secular values, the neo-imperialism of the West 
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and the Westernized elite in Pakistan, encourages and demands the suppression of 
women in the society and seeks to inhibit many forms of social creativity, such as in the 
arts and media.157  In some ways 'the English medium versus the Urdu medium' debate 
has come to be framed around the contestation of religion between the 'life style liberals' 
and the 'Islamic civil society' in the public sphere. Furthermore there is also a manifest  
contestation between the two worldviews over the very notion of secularism. The 
'Islamic civil society' describes the secularists in Pakistan as being 'stubborn in the face of 
failure' and 'carrying on the tradition of slavery of the British Raj while not knowing the 
first thing about the tradition of secularism in the West'158 and assert that the 'Pakistani 
secularists simply learn random phrases written in the West by rote and hurl them at 
ordinary Pakistanis without knowing what they mean'.159 In this perspective secularism 
has a very 'Western' and 'imperial' context. Conversely opinions in the English speaking 
press suggest that 'secularism should be embraced, but should not be perceived as a 
threat to religious values' and that a secular system of governance is not 'a hindrance to 
Islamic faith but an assurance that individuals can practice their religion freely'.160 The 
equation of secularism with atheism in Pakistan further constrains the possibility of any 
meaningful debate between the two groups. 
 
          Until recently the English and Urdu discourse has been taking place in two 
seemingly different spheres with very limited interaction and acknowledgement 
between both segments (Rahman 2006; 2005). Recently however these entrenched lines 
have blurred and the English-Urdu dichotomy seems to have somewhat dissipated 
because of the increased visibility of Urdu in the public sphere, through debates in the 
media which create a middle space by encouraging a dialogue between the two factions.  
 
The Articulation of a 'Middle Space' in the Media: 
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         The media seems to have rapidly energized the Pakistani society's 'transformative 
ability' and in this regard the scope and scale of the electronic media's reach has been 
specially exceptional. In the print media the newspapers that publish in Urdu are said to 
have a broader reach than the English-language papers, but in a population of 140 
million the Urdu newspapers do not have a combined circulation of even 10 million 
copies. Similarly the circulation of Pakistan's entire English-language press is said to be 
no more than 150,000 in a population one hundred times that size. Given this context 
where the print media has such limited access , it is significant to note that almost eighty 
six percent of the Pakistani population has access to the electronic media which allows it  
the imperative of significantly influencing public opinion.161 
      
         Furthermore as an avenue free from many conventional restrictions on expression, 
the media’s impact on the society has been profound and it has resulted is an intensified 
cross-cutting of social messages. The public-private boundaries are increasingly blurring 
and 'cultural citizenship'162 is being practiced in many ways and in different places. The 
media and information 'revolution' is encouraging and shaping public opinion, which in 
turn, impels the government to respond to its needs. In this sense the media has 
introduced a new phenomenon of public accountability which has been largely 
unknown in Pakistan (Lieven 2011; Ali 2008). Numerous political events including back 
channel meetings and negotiations are regularly reported often pushing the uniformed 
and civilian players to explain, if not justify, their moves (Zehra 2012; Ali 2008). The 
media often serve as a forum for political parties, commercial, religious, and other 
interests, as well as influential individuals, to compete with and criticize each other 
publicly. The media does not 'criticize' Islam as such, but leaders of religious parties and 
movements are not exempt from public scrutiny and criticism. Although media 
reporting does not alter the moves made by religious and political elite, it does expose 
the public to the reality of Pakistan’s power play and politics. All opinions in the public 
realm are scrutinized against the public’s 'inherent common sense and its experiential 
wisdom' and the media discussions in turn 'educates' the public opinion. (Eickleman 
and Salvatore 2009; Butler and Habermas 2011)  In this way public debate and 
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discussion, which many people are critical of and uncomfortable with, have emerged as 
new 'power tool' in Pakistan. (Lieven 2011)  
 
       Significantly the media has initiated national debates in the Urdu language. 
Previously most intellectual debates were restricted to English print media or the state-
controlled Pakistan television. This is significant because of the way that the masses in 
Pakistan have been effectively disenfranchised through the barriers erected by the 
'supremacy of the English language' in the public discourse (Rahman 2005). The English 
speaking press in Pakistan is said to have somewhat essentialized the non-English 
speaking sections as the 'passive' and 'uncultured' other and has manifestly upheld the 
worldview of the lifestyle liberals (Zehra 2012; Rahman 2006; Asdar Ali 2004; Ghazali 
1994).  On the other hand the Urdu language press has long perpetuated the orthodox 
viewpoints that resonate with political Islam. In this way the Urdu language print media 
facilitates the narratives of the political Islam which encourage an emotional, intolerant 
and angry view of the world in which the 'enemies of Islam' are 'waging a war on Islam' 
and Pakistan.163 In this sense it empowers and becomes the voice of the religious elite.  
The Urdu language print media is therefore seen as being a 'pro-establishment' and 
'right wing' phenomenon, which incessantly propagates 'religious nationalism' and 
'conspiracy theories'. (Husain 2012; Rahman 2006; Patel 2011) However in an 
unprecedented way, both these worldviews are now unwittingly forced to converse and 
publicly debate with each other on the mainstream electronic media. 
         
        In this way the media becomes a 'middle space' which facilitates social dialogue. 
Lieven describes the Pakistan media also  as a 'microcosm' of the Pakistani society and 'a 
powerful  and moderate middle class political force' that is dominated by an educated 
but 'conservative middle class sensibility'164. The media does not overtly endorse the 
values and viewpoints of the 'Islamic civil society' or the 'life-style liberal' since extreme 
views and 'final truths' do not stand the test of facts in the public sphere. This however 
has led the media to be vilified as a 'right-wing' phenomenon by the 'life-style liberals' 
and also as reviled by the orthodox segments of the society for following 'a wrong 
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Islam'.165 This is because in response to the demands of a majority of viewers the media 
articulates strong element of popular culture and popular religion, such as worships of 
local saints, intra-religious and sectarian unity,  gender roles and other open debates. 
However the media itself is not without contradictions and its ways can sometimes be 
'haphazard' and in many cases questionable (Husain 2012 ; Rashid 2012 ; Lieven 2011).  
 
       In a sense the contestation of religion continues within some sections of the media as 
well, with the segments of the cultural media representing the entertainment and 
fashion industry being dominated by the lifestyle liberals, who show a manifest 
proclivity for 'elitist' aspirations and representations. The confluence of such liberalized 
lifestyle outlooks and the technological revolution has created a 'high culture' which 
projects 'a false air of affluence' in the media ( Hasan 2002). Furthermore a normative 
and aspirational value seems to be  placed on the identity created by this 'high culture', 
which is manifestly dismissive of religion. Such an obvious aversion to interrogating the 
actual practices of popular culture in the public sphere by the 'lifestyle liberals' negates 
'the continued importance of religious imagery, values and culture in Pakistan' (Iqtidar 
2011), even as it continues to elicit fierce reactions from the 'Islamic civil society'. In this 
sense the visual culture also becomes polarized because it is dominated by 
representations of the lifestyle liberals on the one end and the Islamic civil society on the 
other, but is largely dismissive of the popular sensibilities. However there are exceptions 
and in this context it would be worthy to  point out the  phenomenon that is Coke 
Studio166, which showcases a fusion of popular and folk music with a modern Western 
flair. Devotional religiosty that is represented in the traditional qawaalis and Sufi kalams, 
which were previously largely absent on the media platorm, is a significant element of 
the programme. The semi-improvised, semi classical musical performances highlight the 
diversity in music, poetry, cultures and languages that exist in Pakistan and connects 
distinct styles, identities and ethnicities within the common denominator of music. In 
this way using music's visceral drive the Coke Studio has created a rare space for 
modern entertainment which reflects sensibilities in the popular culture and presents 
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popular folk music with a sacred slant. In this sense it is also a singular space in Pakistan 
where  popular culture meets high culture, in a non-confrontational way. 
 
       In this way the media significantly exposes the 'fault lines of polarization'167 in the 
Pakistani society but it also however broadens space for inclusive politics, creative 
culture and a conscious intellect. The role of religious belief and practice in the public 
and private spaces, from the modes of dress to means of political engagement are 
increasingly dissected from different angles. In this sense the media performs a 
remarkable feat by encouraging a  wide range of discussions on such issues and creating 
a debate on the diversity of religion, bringing opinions from ideologically and politically 
opposed camps on a common platform to engage in a conversation on contentious 
subjects like religion or women's issues. An instructive anecdote to this fact would be a 
recent episode of a religious talk show in which a Sunni cleric, who pronounced that 'it 
was un-Islamic for women to dye their hair', was outrightly discredited by a woman 
caller and his fellow Shi'a cleric on the show, 'who wanted to know why he dyed his 
own beard'.168  
 
         Since Islam forms the focus of a large number of the debates in the media, the 
monopoly of institutionalized political Islam in the public sphere is effectively 
challenged by such debates in the media. (Zehra 2012; Lieven 2011; Marsden 2010) The 
consciousness of media power and the increased accessibility of media, even in 
authoritarian sociopolitical contexts, also seems to have provided 'alternatives' to 
articulation of Islamist thought and action in immediate political terms. It also changes 
the priorities of the Islamists' own agenda for whom to the construction of 'an 
Islamically informed public' becomes a more realistic goal than the establishment of a 
local or worldwide Islamic state' (Eickleman and Salvatore 2009; Butler and Habermas 
2011). In this sense religious belief and practice play a dynamic, and often constructive, 
role in shaping the public sphere in a vital way. 
       
 
                                                 
167
 Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: A Hard Country. Allen Lane. 2011. p 127-135 
168
 Ibid. p 230-233 
 62 
Conclusion: 
              
          This paper shows that religion is clearly a contested space in Pakistan. Until 
recently 'Islam' has been presented as a static and unitary phenomenon in the public 
sphere, which the state constantly supervises and manages. Such representations distort 
the diversity and negotiability of the Muslim identity in Pakistan which is articulated in 
multiple ways. This work therefore attempts to provide an analytical insight into such 
complexity based on the existing resources that are available to capture the complex 
reality of people's religious lives. In this sense however it also highlights the dearth of 
analytical knowledge that can represent the diversity of religious expression in Pakistan 
or which is able to capture the rich details of the religious lives of Pakistanis. Such a lack 
of analysis is conspicuous in its absence since it is only by representing the complexity of 
positions and locations that people take through negotiation, accommodation and 
resistance in the society that the ordinary Pakistani Muslim identity can find meaningful 
articulation .   
  
          In this regard this paper underlines the distinction between popular religion, 
which has largely been relegated to people's private lives, and the politicized and 
institutionalized Islam which has long dominated the public sphere. This distinction 
helps us understand the current socio-political context in Pakistan where Islam has 
become a 'problem' in the public sphere and has come to be contested between those 
who want to banish it from the public sphere and those who want to impose rigid 
interpretations of it. Furthermore this study underlines the fact that the contestation 
between these two groups is not really a contest between religious and secularism 
because neither do the lifestyle liberals uphold liberal secularism nor do the Islamic civil 
society represent the 'Islam' that most Pakistanis believe in. It is also clear from the 
above analysis therefore that the focus of such contestation is the unitary and 
institutionalized form of religion and not the popular lived religion. In this sense this 
study underlines the way in which popular religion does not have sufficient 
representation in the public sphere, while by contrast the political and institutionalized 
forms of Islam are manifestly visible. It also highlights the way in which this 
 63 
contestation over religion takes place in public spaces, the media, academic settings , 
linguistic affiliations, over the bodies of women and even on the characters of iconic 
national figures. This study however shows that these two contesting worldviews are 
largely irrelevant to ordinary people and are not representative of the popular 'thick' 
Islam, which is a very personalized, localized and contextualized phenomenon for 
individual believers.  
         
       Furthermore this study shows that there is extensive conflation of social categories 
which leads to misidentification and misrepresentation of actual popular orientations 
and outlooks in the public sphere. Most Pakistanis seem to uphold tradition and 
modernity in equal measure and the diverse expressions of Islam in Pakistan shows that 
it has the inherent capacity to engage with both. It also highlights the need to transcend 
the western religious-secular binaries as the current sensibility of Pakistani people 
shows that both are irrelevant to them. Ultimately the discussion in this paper shows 
that such categories are elitist discourses and ordinary Pakistanis do not consciously 
affiliate themselves with such enforced identities. However the space or the choice 
available to be able to conform to neither of these categories seems to be shrinking 
increasingly due the contestation of religion in the public sphere. In this sense this paper 
argues that organizing peoples religious experiences into neat reductionist categories 
and forcing them to conform with either 'secular' or 'religious' identities is extremely 
problematic because of the risk of silencing voices which do not identify with these 
categories or representations, and in the process something is lost. Therefore this paper 
concludes that narratives of religion that emerge from the contestation between the 
dominating 'lifestyle  liberals' and the Islamic civil society' stifle and constrain the 
creativity of the popular debate on religion, by not allowing it adequate space for 
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